Hi John, here is some information from a 592nd After Action Report:
10th—31st December 1944
On the morning of 10th December 1944, the Battalion moved from a bivouac in the woods about one and one‑half miles North East of St. Vith, Belgium at 0600 hours. The march was made in blackout under conditions of heavy snow and extremely slippery roads. From about 0845 until 1430 hours the Battalion stopped in a defiladed position on the dirt road between Andler and Laudesfeld, Germany, while the 12th FA Bn, 2d Inf. Div. vacated the positions we were to occupy in the vicinity of Laudesfeld. Two howitzer sections of each battery were in the near vicinity of each battery position to be occupied. These sections moved in as soon as the pieces from the 12th FAB moved out. At 1345 hours the number two piece of Battery “B” fired the first round for the Battalion in a registration on the base point. This mission was conducted by an unknown observer from the 15th FAB (105H), 2d Infantry Division. The occupation of the position was completed by 1800 hours. (A P992899 B 986892 C 984899 Direction of fire — compass 1900).
No missions were fired until the 12th of December 1944 because of the extremely poor visibility, but on that day registrations were fired for each battery to check laying and velocity error in the base pieces. The remainder of the period until December 16th was spent in improving positions, drawing ammunition to bring the battalion up to its basic load, and establishing observation to supplement that of the 589th FAB (105H) which we were reinforcing. it was originally planned that observers would remain in line with their parties for three days. After the first two observers (one each from Battery “A” and Battery “B”) returned the observing tour was made two days. One observer from Battery “C” manned an observation post at Roth on the north flank of the Division sector each day from 0830 hours until 1630 hours. Mission for the most part consisted of harassing and interdiction missions in the towns and crossroads in the Battalion sectors. The bulk of the missions were selected by the S‑3 who based them on observers reports.
On the morning of December 16th at about 0500 hours, personnel on guard, or on duty, heard extremely heavy artillery fire falling seemingly on our front lines to the South, opposite Prüm Germany. At 0600 hours Battery “A” reported that artillery fire of an undetermined caliber was falling in the position area. During the morning, the battalion fired two missions reinforcing fires from the 589th FAB on German infantry attacks. Fire was effective in stopping each attack. At approximately 1100 hours the 589th FAB reported that there was an estimated company of German infantry in Auw, Germany, a small village about 1800 yards North East of the battalion area. All the Batteries were immediately notified of this and patrols were organized for future needs. At about 1200 hours, Captain Bernard Richman, 01171328, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery, reached the fire direction center on foot and reported that he had been forced to fight his way out of Auw, Germany, after having been ambushed there. he lost his driver, but organized a dozen members of Company “A” 81st Engineers into a patrol and brought them cross country with him to our command post. At this time patrols of Headquarters and Battery “A” had already circled a wooded hill to the North of the battalion area in an effort to stop an enemy penetration from that direction. During the lunch period which followed, considerable small arms fire — seemingly unaimed — fell into the village of Laudesfeld. This caused rather hurried trips to the mess shacks.
At approximately 1500 hours, Battery “A's” patrol was forced back to its dugout at the machine gun outpost, about 600 yards from the battery position, and there it supported one section (40mm) of Battery “D”, AAA AW Bn, and Battery “C” 589th FAB in stopping three observed tanks (reported to be Mark Ivs) and to SP 88's. This patrol suffered heavy casualties from mortar, tank and machine gun fire. The battalion S‑2, Captain Samuel N.Richbourg, 0304885, attempted to adjust one platoon of Battery “C” on the tanks, but he could not observe to do so. He was finally told to withdraw with his patrol because of the intense fire he was receiving. By 1630 hours, mortar and machine gun fire in Battery “A” position became so great that the battery was ordered to withdraw the personnel to a defiladed position. During the fire fight that ensued in the afternoon, Pvt Alfred E. Macaluso, T/5 Robert W. Touchette and Corporal Lloyd Marty of Headquarters Battery aided an unidentified gunner corporal from Battery “C” 589th FAB by serving as a gun crew. This group destroyed one German tank with fire from a 105 howitzer. During this same period of time a bazooka team from Battery “A”, T/5 Koscuisco, Pvt Andrews and Pvt Maw, definitely destroyed another German tank, these men were subsequently wounded. When Captain Richbourg was unable to secure an adjustment on the German tanks, 1st Lt. A.V. Siekierski, 01176507, Battalion Forward Observer, attempted to adjust fire of the left platoon Battery “C” on the tanks in the village of Auw. He secured his adjustment on the Church steeple in Auw, and several volleys were fired in the town. While he was adjusting fire Lt. Siekierski received an overshot from a tank and then a short which hit the mess shack of the Service battery. This round instantly killed T/4 William F. Kouskie, 36477759 and Pfc James T. Campbell, 34141257, cooks, and destroyed the kitchen equipment. At 1327 hours the battalion fired an observed concentration on German Infantry assembling in woods (P 047902). The fire for effect apparently broke up the assembly. The observer was Captain Joseph W. Cocke, 01176582, 589th FAB. 1st Lt. Issac N. Alexander, Executive of Battery “A” was hit by a tank shell while attempting to go to the aid of some of his men who were wounded. 1st Lt. Rex C. Matson, RO of Battery “C”, and his party were ambushed while they were going to their observation post at Roth.
This news reached Captain Robert Smith, 01165563, Commanding Officer, Battery “C” while he was returning from the rear echelon.
Captain Smith found the Battalion ammunition train at Schönberg, Germany north of which it was unable to travel because of enemy activity, The train was forced to return to St. Vith.
At approximately 1830 hours Battery “A” was ordered to return to its pieces in the position area. Despite fire from light machine guns which was falling in the area, Cpt Genero H. Mondragom, Commanding Officer, Battery “A” and S/Sgt Joseph W. Fielder, Senior Chief of Section, rallied the remaining personnel of the battery (about forty‑five men) and winched the pieces out of their dug in positions and saved the bulk of their equipment, including all the howitzers and five tractor.
At 2000 hours, Brig. Gen Leo T. McMahon, Commanding General, 106th Div. Arty, ordered the Battalion to displace to the vicinity of St. Vith. To do this the Battalion Commander sent a reconnaissance party under Captain Richbourg to Division Artillery Headquarters to carry out this mission. The battalion proceeded to move out to the rear at 2300 hours. It was necessary to take the road which passed within an estimated eight hundred yards of German machine gun positions and forked sharply to the right.
It was necessary to “back and fill” all two and one‑half ton trucks with towed loads at this corner. The withdrawal drew no aimed fire, although machine gun passed over this corner too high to be effective. In the course of the march one gun section, the mess truck, one fifth section M5 tractor and M21 ammunition trailer and one three‑quarter ton truck and one‑quarter ton trailer from Battery “A” made a wrong turn on the route of march and were caught in a concentration at a road junction. This report was received at Division Artillery headquarters at 0630 hours from 1st Sgt John C. Beck, who proceeded to the Command Post of the 590th FAB (105H) to get aid for the wounded. They have not since been seen or reported. The battalion closed in St. Vith by 0630 hours.
At 0830 hours the battalion moved into position about one mile northeast of St. Vith The ammunition train arrived in the area at about 1100 hours and proceeded to dump three hundred rounds of shell H.E. at the positions. The train then departed to pick up another load of howitzer ammunition and to replace bazooka and small arms which had been expended in the close defense of the position on the previous day. Around 1400 hours, 1st Lt. R C. Johnson, Division Artillery Survey Officer, arrived at the command post. He stated that the Commanding general, Division Artillery, had directed that the battalion be prepared to displace to the West on short notice. Meanwhile communications by wire were established with the Division Artillery Air Field. 1st Lt. Alonzo A. Neese, Air Observer, and 2d Lt George Stafford, Pilot, took of to attempt to register the battalion on a point along the St. Vith‑Schönberg road. When they flew over this area they suddenly drew machine gun fire from at least five observed points. 1st Lt. Neese observed a column of German tanks and Infantry on the road about thirty‑five hundred yards east of our position area. He adjusted the fire of Battery “B” on the column and observed in the first volley of fire for effect, the leading tank took a direct hit and blew up. The column stopped and dispersed.
The fire from Battery “C” on this mission was stopped because all communications with the battery from fire direction center was disrupted after the second adjusting volley. Tanks, tank destroyers and tractors of heavy and medium artillery battalions tore out all wire communications. Battery “B” fired fifty rounds on the tank column, and 1st Lt. George Peddicord, 01180294, the Executive reported that the bursts from the battery's rounds landing could be observed, in part from the battery position. The battery was given march orders and moved out at 1545 hours. Small arms fire was then falling in the positions and continued to do so in very light volume while the column was halted on the road north of St. Vith, because of the heavy traffic jam in town. However, no casualties were sustained at this time. The Battalion moved to the heavily wooded area approximately two and one‑quarter miles west of Rodt on the St. Vith—Vielsalm road. Rations were consumed sparingly at this time, and those members of the command who were not on guard duty found little difficulty in sleeping.
On the morning of December 18th, very heavy small arms and machine gun fire, as well as occasional platoon volleys of light artillery fire fell on a point estimated to be fifteen hundred yards from the battalion bivouac. Preparations were being made for close defense of the area, when at 0830 hours, Colonel Malin Craig, Division Artillery Executive, arrived with instructions from Brig Gen Leo T. McMahon for us to move South and South‑West through Hinderhausen and Krombach to Bovigny. This order was carried out at once, although Battery “C” had to abandon one M5 tractor which could not be repaired to run. The battalion proceeded to a point fifteen hundred yards Southeast of Bovigny where it occupied a position of readiness, but did not fire. Through a misunderstanding of orders which were passed down from the Commanding General, Division Artillery, the battalion moved into an overnight bivouac at Ottre (P 646851) where a hot meal was served from a consolidated battalion mess, and trucks were completely gassed. A strong guard was established and the battalion rested until 0630 the next morning.
At this time the Assistant Battalion S‑4, CWO James B. Bennett arrived and conveyed orders from the Division Artillery S‑3 for the battalion to move out to the West towards LaRoche and Marche. The battalion moved within one‑half hour. Once the entire battalion was on the hard pavement, the vehicles were stopped and the chains taken off the wheeled vehicles. When we reach Marche, the Battalion Commander attempted to reach Eighth Corps Headquarters by telephone, but all communications with the outside were by now disrupted. He failed to find anyone who had information for him, although the Division Headquarters, according to the Division Adjutant general, was moving to Marche. The battalion proceeded to the vicinity of Haversin (P 193865) where the battalion Commander again attempted to get instructions and information. This was again impossible, and at 1530 the battalion moved to an over‑night bivouac in the vicinity of Serville, about eight miles west of Dinant.
The next morning (December 20th) the battalion Commander proceeded to the vicinity of Rosee where he met Colonel Craig, who directed the Battalion Commander to move back to Vielsalm. This the battalion did, although the route originally planned had to be altered, since LaRoche was under artillery fire when the battalion reconnaissance party arrived there. At 1930 hours, the battalion arrived at the Division Artillery Command post at Rencheaux and the Commanding general Division Artillery directed the battalion Commander to occupy positions in the vicinity of Commanster (P7685) and reinforce the fires of the 591st FAB (105H). This was accomplished by 0230 hours, 21 December, under cover of darkness and a heavy mist which made blackout driving difficult. Service battery and the maintenance sections of the other batteries remained at Neuville (P 718883)
On December 21st a forward observer from the 591st FAB adjusted the battalion on a base point, and the battalion fired approximately one hundred rounds from these positions over a front of about 1600 mils. On the morning of 22 December several headquarters, including the 424th Infantry (106th Infantry Division), Division Artillery (106th Infantry Division) and CCB, 9th Armored Division moved into Commanster. At 1500 hours General McMahon authorized reconnaissance from position to the west, and at 1700 the battalion except one platoon each from Battery “B” and Battery “C” and part of the fire direction center moved to new positions. (A 7222887 B 724887 C 737878). At 2145 hours the second echelon was ordered to displace. General McMahon ordered the Battalion Commander at 220 hours to move the battalion out at once and for him to report to Colonel Craig at the Division Artillery Command post at Rencheuz (P 695891). The Battalion moved out and stopped at Neuville for approximately twenty‑five minutes to gas, and then proceed to the vicinity of Chene‑al‑pierre, as directed by Colonel Craig, where it arrived at 0300. A guard was posted and the personnel slept as best they could despite the severe cold.
General Mcmahon arrived at the bivouac at 0830 hours on December 23rd and directed that the battalion would reinforce the fires of the 82d Airborne Division Artillery from positions in the general vicinity. By 1400 hours the battalion was in position, dug in and ready to fire starting at 1515 hours the battalion fired 260 rounds, chiefly on the crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture. At 1800 hours the battalion was attached to XVIII Corps (Airborne). At 0400 hours 24 December, urgent calls for fires in the vicinity of Odeigne (P 536862) were relayed through Captain Joseph M. Potts, 0413103, Commanding Officer Battery “B” who was at Manhay with a radio. After much difficulty in getting this request cleared through Corps Fire Direction Center (because of the rather confused picture of the front lines), the mission and other in the area were fired. A total of fourteen hundred eighty‑one rounds were fired on December 24th from this position. The battalion was ordered to move to positions approximately fifteen hundred yards North West of Webonmount (P540000), and did so at 1730 hours on December 24th. The command post was at Ernonheid (P 530025) and the batteries were at ( A 529015 B 530041 C 531025).
On December 25th, the battalion fired three hundred forty rounds. It participated in two TOT missions at 1335 and 1355 on the town of Manhay (P 532902); the battalion had been registered on the cross roads in town by air at 100 hours. Later observation by Infantry Officers indicated that they found three hundred fifty dead Germans and eighty wrecked vehicles in the town as a result of artillery fire. The battalion was attached to the 211th Group on this date.
Between December 26th and the 30th, the battalion continued to fire from these positions. In this time the fires were chiefly unobserved or K‑transfer missions on enemy troop concentrations in the heavily wooded area South of Manhay; a few missions were against either individual self‑propelled guns or enemy batteries. It was at this time that a combined force of troops from the 82d Airborne Division, 7th Armd Division and the 424th Regiment (106th Infantry Division) stopped the determined attack of the German 9th SS Panzer Division towards the North. A total of eighty four missions and approximately eighteen hundred and fifty rounds of H.E. were fired in this period.
At 1600 hours December 30th the battalion displaced to positions which had been reconnoitered in the vicinity of Rahier (A 604003) B 610001 C 604001); this was done on the order of Col. Dixon, Commanding Officer 211th Group. From these positions the battalion fired two unobserved missions on the night of December 30 on the town of Malempre (P 592889). On December 31st the battalion fired thirty‑five missions which included three registrations, and three counter‑battery missions. The bulk of the other missions were on troop assembly areas. One mission on a nebelwerfer battery was observed to be “range and deflection correct.” On the stroke of 2400 the battalion participated in three TOT missions with the remainder of the Corps in a New Years greeting to the enemy.
Hope this helps!
All the best,
Carl
www.the106thinfantrydivision.be.tt
