106-ID, AAR, Summary, December 1944, Battle of the Bulge (1°
Nov 18, 2015 1:34:56 GMT -5
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Post by eucmh on Nov 18, 2015 1:34:56 GMT -5
After Action Report
81st Engineer (C) Battalion Report
106th Division Artillery Report
106th Division Special Troops Report
331st Medical Battalion Report
424th Infantry Regiment Report
G-1 Report
G-2 Report
G-3 Report
G-4 Report
The commanding officers and staffs of the 422-IR, 423-IR and the 106-Rcn Troop are missing in action. Their records are presumed to have been destroyed and are not available. The action of these units is covered, but not completely, in the reports and journals of the General Staff Sections. The 14-CG was attached to the division from Dec 11, 1900 to Dec 18, 1300. Its action, in part, during this period is included in the reports and journals of the general Staff Sections. After Dec 18, 1300, it was attached to the 7-AD.
Summary of action against the enemy for December 1944
The 106-ID moved from England to France and closed in its concentration area in the vicinity of Limesey (FR), to St Vith (BE), completing the move at 1830, 10 Dec 1944. In compliance with the VII Corps order the 106-ID with attachments, relieved the 2-ID in place. The Commanding General, 106-ID assumed responsibility for the defense of the sector at 1900, 11 Dec 1944. The major units attached to the division at this time were :
14th Cavalry Group
820th Tank Destroyer Bn
634th AAA AW Bn (M)
Early Dec 16, the enemy launched a coordinated infantry-tank attack with an estimated two Infantry Divisions and elements of two Panzer Divisions preceded by an extensive artillery preparation. Captured documents taken by the division indicated the scope of the German attack. The undertaking Grief appeared to be part of this large scale counteroffensive. The German attack increased in fury and continued, generally along the whole sector, during the day. Reports indicated that the divisions to the north and south of the division sector were likewise receiving strong attacks and that the enemy had effected some penetrations. Local reserves were used to expel the enemy and to limit penetrations in the division sector.
32-C-Rcn-Sq was released to the 14-CG at 0705, Dec 16
1/424-IR, was committed at 1145 on Dec 16, to eject the enemy from the center of the sector of the 424-IR and then to hold Winterspelt (GER)
14-CG fell back in the northern sector, exposing the north flank of the 422-IR
At 1700, Dec 16, 2/423-IR, in division reserve, was committed in the gap between the 14-CG and the 422-IR to stop the German advance around the exposed flank
By 2000, Dec 16, the original positions were generally intact except in the northern sector where the 14-CG was back on the line Andler (BE) - Herresbach (BE) - Wereth (BE)
CCB 9-AD was attached 1120, Dec 16 at Faymonville (BE). As soon as the unit could be contacted preparations were made for its early employment against the enemy penetration in the northern sector. Later the division commander was notified that the 7-AD was also attached and would arrive vicinity of St Vith by Dec 17 at 0700
Plans were then made for the morning of Dec 17 Dec to use CCB-7-AD to contain and eliminate the enemy penetration in the northern part of the division sector.<br />
At 0630, Dec 17, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the sector of the 423-IR in the vicinity of Bleialf (GER). He pushed some forces north from Bleialf while other enemy forces advances south from Andler (BE), the two forces effecting a junction in the vicinity of Schoenberg (BE) during the morning. This cut direct communication by road and wire between the units east of the Bleialf - Schoenberg MSR (Main Supply Road) and the remainder of the division.
The units cut off were :
422nd Infantry Regiment
423rd Infantry Regiment
590th Field Artillery Battalion
589th Field Artillery Battalion (part only)
B Co 81st Engineer (C) Bn
B Co 331st Medical Battalion
C Co 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion
D Battery 634th AAA (Automatic Weapon) Bn (M)
Radio communication was maintained with these units until late Dec 18, arrangements were made for supplies to be dropped by air but the weather was non-operational.
The 7-AD did not arrive by 0700 Dec 17 as scheduled. The CG of CCB, and some reconnaissance elements of the division arrived at St Vith at 1520 Dec 17. The reconnaissance elements were disposed in the late afternoon north and northeast of the town to protect the deployment of the division when it arrived. Meanwhile, the Germans had pushed on through Schoenberg towards St Vith. The remaining combat elements available to the division :
81st Engineer (C) Battalion less 2 Companies
part of the 168th Engineer (C) Battalion
Defense Platoon of Division HQs Company
One Plat of TDs attached were committed to the east of St Vith and this force stopped the German advance two kilometers east of the town , Dec 17 at 1700. In the meantime, in the sector of the 424-IR, the enemy renewed his attack and by Dec 17 at 0830 had occupied Winterspelt (GER) and pushed northwest towards Steinebruck (BE).<br />
This cut off the :
106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
B Troop, 18th Cav Recon Squadron in vicinity of Mützenich (GER)
CCB-9AD was committed in a counterattack when it arrived early on Dec 17, to stop and throw back this German thrust. This counterattack was successful in securing the crossing of the Our River at Steinebruck (BE) and advancing to the north edge of Winterspelt (GER), but against continuously increasing enemy resistance. To the north and south of Winterspelt the enemy continued to push in with tanks and infantry and he also was meeting with success in the sector of the 28-ID to the south of the 424-IR.
At 1600, Dec 17, CCB-9AD, was ordered to withdraw to a defensive position northwest of the Our River and the 424-IR was ordered to withdraw and defend west of the Our River on the south of CCB. After the arrival of the CG, CCB-7AD, and his advance elements during the afternoon of Dec 17, he was placed in command of a sector to the north of CCB-9AD, including St Vith. Elements of the 106-ID already in defensive positions around St Vith were placed under his command. A counterattack to the east in the direction of St Vith - Schoenberg - Auw (GER) was planned for Dec 18.
At 0215 Dec 18, the 422-IR and 423-IR were ordered to move to the northwest and west against the enemy force in vicinity of the Schoenberg - St Vith (MSR) and then continue to the area St Vith - Wallerode (BE) - Weppeler (BE). They were not successful in breaking through the German forces to their rear. The enemy continued probing during the night of 17-18 Dec and early on 18 Dec renewed his attack. Tank and infantry units advanced against St Vith from the east, north and northeast. A company of tanks and a company of tank destroyers were moved from CCB-9AD to the north of St Vith to hold the enemy until the arrival of the combat elements of CCB-7AD, which committed its elements as they arrived, so that by 0930 (18/12) one battalion of armored infantry and two companies of medium tanks had been deployed. The engineer force east of the town maintained its position against repeated enemy assaults. The fight for St Vith continued during the day but all German attacks were repulsed.
In the southern part of the division sector, CCB-9AD and the 424-IR completed their withdrawal to the west of the Our River and there maintained their positions during 18 Dec. CCB defended the sector just south of St Vith and the 424-IR on its south. Contact was made with the 112-IR (28-ID) which had been separated from the remainder of its division. At 1300 (18/12), boundaries were changed by VIII Corps giving the 7-AD that portion of the 106-ID sector north of the line Houffalize - St Vith, (both inclusive to 106th Infantry Division). The 14-CG was attached to the 7-AD effective Dec 18 1300.
During the next three days (Dec 19, 20 and 21) a seesaw battle was in progress throughout the division sector. Heavy fighting continued around St Vith and to the south. The 112-IR, having been pushed back and cut off completely from its division, was attached to this division at 1600 Dec 19. It was moved to the northeast and tied in with the southern flank of the 424-ID, so that these two regiments held the shoulder of the German breakthrough to the south of the division sector. The 106-ID passed to the control of XVIII Corps (Airborne) at 1600 Dec 20. All enemy attacks were repulsed and the positions held with only minor changes throughout the sector.
By the night of Dec 21/22, the fall of St Vith became imminent and all units of the 106-ID and 7-AD were pulled back on Corps order to form a perimeter defense west of St Vith and east of the Salm River (BE). This defensive position was maintained during 22 Dec. Late on Dec 22, XVIII Corps ordered the 106-ID and the 7-AD to withdraw west of the Salm River, through the 82-ABD which had taken up a defensive position along the Salm and the road running west from Salmchateau (BE). This withdrawal was effected on Dec 23 and the division moved to the vicinity of Werbomont (BE). CCB-9AD and the 112-RCT then passed to control of the XVIII Corps Airborne. The 592-FAB continued in general support as part of a Corps artillery group. During the withdrawal west of the Salm River, a task force from the division, composed of elements of the 589-FAB and 590-FAB, stopped and held the German advance to the north at Baraque de Fraiture (Parker Crossroad)(BE) and protected the right flank of the 82-ABD and the XVIII Corps (Airborne), until relieved by elements of VII Corps.
On Dec 24, the 424-IR was attached to the 7-AD and was again committed in the vicinity of Manhay (BE), where it took part in the final stopping of the German advance on Liège (BE). On Dec 25, the 591-FAB and some of the service elements of the division were attached to the 7-AD. The 592-FAB was attached to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) Artillery. By Dec 30, all attached units except the 591-FAB and 592-FAB had reverted to division control and at the end of the month, the division was assembled west of the Ourthe River in the vicinity of Anthisnes (BE) for reorganization and resupply.
It is presumed that the :
422nd Infantry Regiment
423rd Infantry Regiment
589th Field Artillery Battalion
590th Field Artillery Battalion
106th Reconnaissance Troop
were eventually overpowered by the German forces east of St Vith and the bulk of the personnel captured about Dec 19 or 20. The strength of the German attack in the division sector and the forces available to the division at the time prevented their being relieved. Attempts to supply the units by air failed because of the weather, although, as learned later, two drops were made but not within their reach. It is known that they were still in the fight early Dec 19. It is also known that prisoners were taken by the Germans. However, the final chapter in the defense of the Schnee Eiffel penetration of the Siegfried Line held by these units is not now known. The estimated losses sustained during this period were 8490, including 415 killed in action, 1254 wounded in action and 6821 missing in action. A large part of the organizational equipment and most of the individual clothing and equipment of Combat Team 422, Combat Team 423 and the 106th Reconnaissance Troop were lost when these units were cut off in the Schnee Eiffel region. It is believed that the bulk of the equipment was destroyed.
On Dec 27, 1A stated that the division would, until further notice, consist of the 106-ID less the 422-IR, 423-IR, 589-FAB, 590-FAB and the 106-Rcn Troop. The authorized personnel strength of the division would be 409 officers, 30 warrant officers and 6130 enlisted men, or a total authorized strength of 6569. On Dec 31, the actual strength of the division was 5534.
For the Commanding General F I Agule
Lt Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General
HEADQUARTERS 106TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 443, US ARMY
SUBJECT : Report After Action
January 27 1945
The following Report is based on the Interviews from Maj J. O’Sullivan with Brig Gen Perrin, Col Baker, and Col Brook. Gen Jones and Gen Perrin arrived at St Vith, Dec 8 1944. Conference between Gen Jones and Gen Robertson at 1530 Dec 8. Gen Perrin not present at conference. Only two generals at conference, and Gen Perrin not know actually what said. Gen Perrin met Col John Stokes, 2-ID acting Div CG and Stokes gave orientation on defense maintained by 2-ID and was Stokes understanding that 106-ID was to replace 2-ID man for man. Gen Perrin not know who or how this method of relief was arrived at. Wanted relief done quickly for 2-ID on another mission. Gen Jones remained with Div until Dec 22. Gen Perrin took over Dec 22 1900 at CP 7-AD, Vielsalm (BE) by command of Gen Matthew B. Ridgway in person. Present were :
- Jones (106-ID)
- Ridgway (XVIII A/B)
- Hasbrouck (7-AD)
- Perrin (106-ID)
- Prior to Perrin’s arrival Ridgway told Hasbrouck and Jones that troops in St Vith pocket would be withdrawn from perimeter defense in front of Salmchateau, and 14 hours of darkness in which to do it
- When Ridgway left, Hasbrouck and Perrin started to prepare plan to withdraw troops but it was evident that withdrawal would extend into Saturday
- Worked out plan which was flexible and changed because CCB-9AD and CCA-7AD were actively engaged vicinity St Vith
- Withdrawal began with displacement of artillery shortly after midnight but troops not across river till after dark Dec 23
- Withdrawal continued during daylight
- 592-FAB (106-ID) out first
- 112-IR (28-ID) shifted to defensive positions east of bridges through which troops could withdraw
- 9-AD, then 424-IR, then CCB-7AD withdraw almost concurrently over center and then CCA-7AD (Task Force Rosebaum), CCR-7AD, 1/112-IR, 2/112-IR and 3/112-IR which were maintaining defensive positions at bridges east of Vielsalm (BE) and Salmchateau (BE)
- Gen Hasbrouck and Gen Perrin left CP 7-AD when reported that enemy tanks in Vielsalm (BE) and an enemy tank in street as leaving building and fired at half track and two peeps – front of CP
- During withdrawal were able to infiltrate small units of 14-CG and odds and ends of Corps unit within pocket
- Withdrawal successful and all personnel except a few got across
- Very few vehicles left behind in proportion to what there
- In meantime Div CP echelon had moved to Vaux-Chavanne (BE)
- Rear at Ferrières (BE)
- Gen Perrin remained on other side of bridge till last elements of 112-IR had crossed and told Gen Hasbrouck that Perrin is going to new Div CP in order to effect reorganization as fast as possible of combat elements of Div, mainly 424-IR and artillery
- Perrin went to Werbomont (BE) to locate new Div CP and met en route by Brig Gen Buechler who flagged jeep in dark, inquired who was senior officer and informed him that that Corps CP that all available troops be used for roadblocks at Manhay (BE)
- Told Gen Buechler that as soon as 424-IR found this would be done
- Got there at app 0200 Dec 24 and C/S informed him that Gen Buechler had called and asked that Perrin call Buechler when Perrin arrived
- Perrin called Buechler by phone and Buechler stated to Perrin that if Cos not already out not to do so; other arrangements had been made. Arrangements known to units
- Div Staff arrived at Vaux-Chavanne Dec 23 at 0500
- From that location Div Staff supervised and directed movement of Div units after withdrawal over Salm River
- Directed combat and service elements to previously designated assembly areas and CP at forward edge of combat elements
- During AM Dec 23 C/S received from Gen Perrin to have repres
- Meet C/S 7-AD and Corps and 82-A/BD at 82 CP at Bra-sur-Lienne
- Col Glatteaver G-4 went and Lt James Willis went, attended conference and received change in ass Area, calling for assembly of whole 106-ID in area just north or east, west of Werbomont
- Col Baker changed previous designated unit areas and got units started to new ass Area
- After talking with Gen Perrin decided to move CP to new ass Area vicinity of Faiveux (BE)
- In PM Dec 23 when units moved and moving in did move CP to Faiveux
- This was location that Gen Perrin came to and called Gen Buechler
- About 0300 Dec 24 Gen Ridgway called with message that he desired all troops be given a message that this was Germans’ last gasp (message in journal)
- Meanwhile 0330 Corps called for Col James Reid CO 424-IR to report to Corps relative to getting his regt collected as rapidly as possible for Corps use
- Bns called for 7-AD to furnish transport
- 424-IR alerted
- Gen Perrin and Col Baker went to Corps Hqrs as result of phone call from Corps C/S in which he told of plan to use 424-IR
- At conference Gen Perrin reconn that in view of urgent situation such units of 106-ID as might be required be attached to 7-AD, to facilitate defense. Stated that there were no combat elements of 106-ID available since 424-IR was to be utilized as indicated by Corps C/S. 592-FAB was firing under Corps control and left 591-FAB and Service units available
- Gen Perrin and C/S returned to Div CP and Corps C/S called and said that Corps CG had concurred in plan as discussed except that Gen Perrin to report to 7-AD about 1900, Dec 24
- From then on was CG 106-ID and asst Div CO 7 ARM
- Col Baker in charge
- Remained at 7 Army until Dec 27 when relieved by phone calls from Corps and directed to return to 106-ID and proceed to reorganize and re-equip 106-ID
For the Commanding General
F I Agule
Lt Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General
(archive check&correx @ eucmh)
81st Engineer (C) Battalion Report
106th Division Artillery Report
106th Division Special Troops Report
331st Medical Battalion Report
424th Infantry Regiment Report
G-1 Report
G-2 Report
G-3 Report
G-4 Report
The commanding officers and staffs of the 422-IR, 423-IR and the 106-Rcn Troop are missing in action. Their records are presumed to have been destroyed and are not available. The action of these units is covered, but not completely, in the reports and journals of the General Staff Sections. The 14-CG was attached to the division from Dec 11, 1900 to Dec 18, 1300. Its action, in part, during this period is included in the reports and journals of the general Staff Sections. After Dec 18, 1300, it was attached to the 7-AD.
Summary of action against the enemy for December 1944
The 106-ID moved from England to France and closed in its concentration area in the vicinity of Limesey (FR), to St Vith (BE), completing the move at 1830, 10 Dec 1944. In compliance with the VII Corps order the 106-ID with attachments, relieved the 2-ID in place. The Commanding General, 106-ID assumed responsibility for the defense of the sector at 1900, 11 Dec 1944. The major units attached to the division at this time were :
14th Cavalry Group
820th Tank Destroyer Bn
634th AAA AW Bn (M)
Early Dec 16, the enemy launched a coordinated infantry-tank attack with an estimated two Infantry Divisions and elements of two Panzer Divisions preceded by an extensive artillery preparation. Captured documents taken by the division indicated the scope of the German attack. The undertaking Grief appeared to be part of this large scale counteroffensive. The German attack increased in fury and continued, generally along the whole sector, during the day. Reports indicated that the divisions to the north and south of the division sector were likewise receiving strong attacks and that the enemy had effected some penetrations. Local reserves were used to expel the enemy and to limit penetrations in the division sector.
32-C-Rcn-Sq was released to the 14-CG at 0705, Dec 16
1/424-IR, was committed at 1145 on Dec 16, to eject the enemy from the center of the sector of the 424-IR and then to hold Winterspelt (GER)
14-CG fell back in the northern sector, exposing the north flank of the 422-IR
At 1700, Dec 16, 2/423-IR, in division reserve, was committed in the gap between the 14-CG and the 422-IR to stop the German advance around the exposed flank
By 2000, Dec 16, the original positions were generally intact except in the northern sector where the 14-CG was back on the line Andler (BE) - Herresbach (BE) - Wereth (BE)
CCB 9-AD was attached 1120, Dec 16 at Faymonville (BE). As soon as the unit could be contacted preparations were made for its early employment against the enemy penetration in the northern sector. Later the division commander was notified that the 7-AD was also attached and would arrive vicinity of St Vith by Dec 17 at 0700
Plans were then made for the morning of Dec 17 Dec to use CCB-7-AD to contain and eliminate the enemy penetration in the northern part of the division sector.<br />
At 0630, Dec 17, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the sector of the 423-IR in the vicinity of Bleialf (GER). He pushed some forces north from Bleialf while other enemy forces advances south from Andler (BE), the two forces effecting a junction in the vicinity of Schoenberg (BE) during the morning. This cut direct communication by road and wire between the units east of the Bleialf - Schoenberg MSR (Main Supply Road) and the remainder of the division.
The units cut off were :
422nd Infantry Regiment
423rd Infantry Regiment
590th Field Artillery Battalion
589th Field Artillery Battalion (part only)
B Co 81st Engineer (C) Bn
B Co 331st Medical Battalion
C Co 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion
D Battery 634th AAA (Automatic Weapon) Bn (M)
Radio communication was maintained with these units until late Dec 18, arrangements were made for supplies to be dropped by air but the weather was non-operational.
The 7-AD did not arrive by 0700 Dec 17 as scheduled. The CG of CCB, and some reconnaissance elements of the division arrived at St Vith at 1520 Dec 17. The reconnaissance elements were disposed in the late afternoon north and northeast of the town to protect the deployment of the division when it arrived. Meanwhile, the Germans had pushed on through Schoenberg towards St Vith. The remaining combat elements available to the division :
81st Engineer (C) Battalion less 2 Companies
part of the 168th Engineer (C) Battalion
Defense Platoon of Division HQs Company
One Plat of TDs attached were committed to the east of St Vith and this force stopped the German advance two kilometers east of the town , Dec 17 at 1700. In the meantime, in the sector of the 424-IR, the enemy renewed his attack and by Dec 17 at 0830 had occupied Winterspelt (GER) and pushed northwest towards Steinebruck (BE).<br />
This cut off the :
106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
B Troop, 18th Cav Recon Squadron in vicinity of Mützenich (GER)
CCB-9AD was committed in a counterattack when it arrived early on Dec 17, to stop and throw back this German thrust. This counterattack was successful in securing the crossing of the Our River at Steinebruck (BE) and advancing to the north edge of Winterspelt (GER), but against continuously increasing enemy resistance. To the north and south of Winterspelt the enemy continued to push in with tanks and infantry and he also was meeting with success in the sector of the 28-ID to the south of the 424-IR.
At 1600, Dec 17, CCB-9AD, was ordered to withdraw to a defensive position northwest of the Our River and the 424-IR was ordered to withdraw and defend west of the Our River on the south of CCB. After the arrival of the CG, CCB-7AD, and his advance elements during the afternoon of Dec 17, he was placed in command of a sector to the north of CCB-9AD, including St Vith. Elements of the 106-ID already in defensive positions around St Vith were placed under his command. A counterattack to the east in the direction of St Vith - Schoenberg - Auw (GER) was planned for Dec 18.
At 0215 Dec 18, the 422-IR and 423-IR were ordered to move to the northwest and west against the enemy force in vicinity of the Schoenberg - St Vith (MSR) and then continue to the area St Vith - Wallerode (BE) - Weppeler (BE). They were not successful in breaking through the German forces to their rear. The enemy continued probing during the night of 17-18 Dec and early on 18 Dec renewed his attack. Tank and infantry units advanced against St Vith from the east, north and northeast. A company of tanks and a company of tank destroyers were moved from CCB-9AD to the north of St Vith to hold the enemy until the arrival of the combat elements of CCB-7AD, which committed its elements as they arrived, so that by 0930 (18/12) one battalion of armored infantry and two companies of medium tanks had been deployed. The engineer force east of the town maintained its position against repeated enemy assaults. The fight for St Vith continued during the day but all German attacks were repulsed.
In the southern part of the division sector, CCB-9AD and the 424-IR completed their withdrawal to the west of the Our River and there maintained their positions during 18 Dec. CCB defended the sector just south of St Vith and the 424-IR on its south. Contact was made with the 112-IR (28-ID) which had been separated from the remainder of its division. At 1300 (18/12), boundaries were changed by VIII Corps giving the 7-AD that portion of the 106-ID sector north of the line Houffalize - St Vith, (both inclusive to 106th Infantry Division). The 14-CG was attached to the 7-AD effective Dec 18 1300.
During the next three days (Dec 19, 20 and 21) a seesaw battle was in progress throughout the division sector. Heavy fighting continued around St Vith and to the south. The 112-IR, having been pushed back and cut off completely from its division, was attached to this division at 1600 Dec 19. It was moved to the northeast and tied in with the southern flank of the 424-ID, so that these two regiments held the shoulder of the German breakthrough to the south of the division sector. The 106-ID passed to the control of XVIII Corps (Airborne) at 1600 Dec 20. All enemy attacks were repulsed and the positions held with only minor changes throughout the sector.
By the night of Dec 21/22, the fall of St Vith became imminent and all units of the 106-ID and 7-AD were pulled back on Corps order to form a perimeter defense west of St Vith and east of the Salm River (BE). This defensive position was maintained during 22 Dec. Late on Dec 22, XVIII Corps ordered the 106-ID and the 7-AD to withdraw west of the Salm River, through the 82-ABD which had taken up a defensive position along the Salm and the road running west from Salmchateau (BE). This withdrawal was effected on Dec 23 and the division moved to the vicinity of Werbomont (BE). CCB-9AD and the 112-RCT then passed to control of the XVIII Corps Airborne. The 592-FAB continued in general support as part of a Corps artillery group. During the withdrawal west of the Salm River, a task force from the division, composed of elements of the 589-FAB and 590-FAB, stopped and held the German advance to the north at Baraque de Fraiture (Parker Crossroad)(BE) and protected the right flank of the 82-ABD and the XVIII Corps (Airborne), until relieved by elements of VII Corps.
On Dec 24, the 424-IR was attached to the 7-AD and was again committed in the vicinity of Manhay (BE), where it took part in the final stopping of the German advance on Liège (BE). On Dec 25, the 591-FAB and some of the service elements of the division were attached to the 7-AD. The 592-FAB was attached to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) Artillery. By Dec 30, all attached units except the 591-FAB and 592-FAB had reverted to division control and at the end of the month, the division was assembled west of the Ourthe River in the vicinity of Anthisnes (BE) for reorganization and resupply.
It is presumed that the :
422nd Infantry Regiment
423rd Infantry Regiment
589th Field Artillery Battalion
590th Field Artillery Battalion
106th Reconnaissance Troop
were eventually overpowered by the German forces east of St Vith and the bulk of the personnel captured about Dec 19 or 20. The strength of the German attack in the division sector and the forces available to the division at the time prevented their being relieved. Attempts to supply the units by air failed because of the weather, although, as learned later, two drops were made but not within their reach. It is known that they were still in the fight early Dec 19. It is also known that prisoners were taken by the Germans. However, the final chapter in the defense of the Schnee Eiffel penetration of the Siegfried Line held by these units is not now known. The estimated losses sustained during this period were 8490, including 415 killed in action, 1254 wounded in action and 6821 missing in action. A large part of the organizational equipment and most of the individual clothing and equipment of Combat Team 422, Combat Team 423 and the 106th Reconnaissance Troop were lost when these units were cut off in the Schnee Eiffel region. It is believed that the bulk of the equipment was destroyed.
On Dec 27, 1A stated that the division would, until further notice, consist of the 106-ID less the 422-IR, 423-IR, 589-FAB, 590-FAB and the 106-Rcn Troop. The authorized personnel strength of the division would be 409 officers, 30 warrant officers and 6130 enlisted men, or a total authorized strength of 6569. On Dec 31, the actual strength of the division was 5534.
For the Commanding General F I Agule
Lt Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General
HEADQUARTERS 106TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 443, US ARMY
SUBJECT : Report After Action
January 27 1945
The following Report is based on the Interviews from Maj J. O’Sullivan with Brig Gen Perrin, Col Baker, and Col Brook. Gen Jones and Gen Perrin arrived at St Vith, Dec 8 1944. Conference between Gen Jones and Gen Robertson at 1530 Dec 8. Gen Perrin not present at conference. Only two generals at conference, and Gen Perrin not know actually what said. Gen Perrin met Col John Stokes, 2-ID acting Div CG and Stokes gave orientation on defense maintained by 2-ID and was Stokes understanding that 106-ID was to replace 2-ID man for man. Gen Perrin not know who or how this method of relief was arrived at. Wanted relief done quickly for 2-ID on another mission. Gen Jones remained with Div until Dec 22. Gen Perrin took over Dec 22 1900 at CP 7-AD, Vielsalm (BE) by command of Gen Matthew B. Ridgway in person. Present were :
- Jones (106-ID)
- Ridgway (XVIII A/B)
- Hasbrouck (7-AD)
- Perrin (106-ID)
- Prior to Perrin’s arrival Ridgway told Hasbrouck and Jones that troops in St Vith pocket would be withdrawn from perimeter defense in front of Salmchateau, and 14 hours of darkness in which to do it
- When Ridgway left, Hasbrouck and Perrin started to prepare plan to withdraw troops but it was evident that withdrawal would extend into Saturday
- Worked out plan which was flexible and changed because CCB-9AD and CCA-7AD were actively engaged vicinity St Vith
- Withdrawal began with displacement of artillery shortly after midnight but troops not across river till after dark Dec 23
- Withdrawal continued during daylight
- 592-FAB (106-ID) out first
- 112-IR (28-ID) shifted to defensive positions east of bridges through which troops could withdraw
- 9-AD, then 424-IR, then CCB-7AD withdraw almost concurrently over center and then CCA-7AD (Task Force Rosebaum), CCR-7AD, 1/112-IR, 2/112-IR and 3/112-IR which were maintaining defensive positions at bridges east of Vielsalm (BE) and Salmchateau (BE)
- Gen Hasbrouck and Gen Perrin left CP 7-AD when reported that enemy tanks in Vielsalm (BE) and an enemy tank in street as leaving building and fired at half track and two peeps – front of CP
- During withdrawal were able to infiltrate small units of 14-CG and odds and ends of Corps unit within pocket
- Withdrawal successful and all personnel except a few got across
- Very few vehicles left behind in proportion to what there
- In meantime Div CP echelon had moved to Vaux-Chavanne (BE)
- Rear at Ferrières (BE)
- Gen Perrin remained on other side of bridge till last elements of 112-IR had crossed and told Gen Hasbrouck that Perrin is going to new Div CP in order to effect reorganization as fast as possible of combat elements of Div, mainly 424-IR and artillery
- Perrin went to Werbomont (BE) to locate new Div CP and met en route by Brig Gen Buechler who flagged jeep in dark, inquired who was senior officer and informed him that that Corps CP that all available troops be used for roadblocks at Manhay (BE)
- Told Gen Buechler that as soon as 424-IR found this would be done
- Got there at app 0200 Dec 24 and C/S informed him that Gen Buechler had called and asked that Perrin call Buechler when Perrin arrived
- Perrin called Buechler by phone and Buechler stated to Perrin that if Cos not already out not to do so; other arrangements had been made. Arrangements known to units
- Div Staff arrived at Vaux-Chavanne Dec 23 at 0500
- From that location Div Staff supervised and directed movement of Div units after withdrawal over Salm River
- Directed combat and service elements to previously designated assembly areas and CP at forward edge of combat elements
- During AM Dec 23 C/S received from Gen Perrin to have repres
- Meet C/S 7-AD and Corps and 82-A/BD at 82 CP at Bra-sur-Lienne
- Col Glatteaver G-4 went and Lt James Willis went, attended conference and received change in ass Area, calling for assembly of whole 106-ID in area just north or east, west of Werbomont
- Col Baker changed previous designated unit areas and got units started to new ass Area
- After talking with Gen Perrin decided to move CP to new ass Area vicinity of Faiveux (BE)
- In PM Dec 23 when units moved and moving in did move CP to Faiveux
- This was location that Gen Perrin came to and called Gen Buechler
- About 0300 Dec 24 Gen Ridgway called with message that he desired all troops be given a message that this was Germans’ last gasp (message in journal)
- Meanwhile 0330 Corps called for Col James Reid CO 424-IR to report to Corps relative to getting his regt collected as rapidly as possible for Corps use
- Bns called for 7-AD to furnish transport
- 424-IR alerted
- Gen Perrin and Col Baker went to Corps Hqrs as result of phone call from Corps C/S in which he told of plan to use 424-IR
- At conference Gen Perrin reconn that in view of urgent situation such units of 106-ID as might be required be attached to 7-AD, to facilitate defense. Stated that there were no combat elements of 106-ID available since 424-IR was to be utilized as indicated by Corps C/S. 592-FAB was firing under Corps control and left 591-FAB and Service units available
- Gen Perrin and C/S returned to Div CP and Corps C/S called and said that Corps CG had concurred in plan as discussed except that Gen Perrin to report to 7-AD about 1900, Dec 24
- From then on was CG 106-ID and asst Div CO 7 ARM
- Col Baker in charge
- Remained at 7 Army until Dec 27 when relieved by phone calls from Corps and directed to return to 106-ID and proceed to reorganize and re-equip 106-ID
For the Commanding General
F I Agule
Lt Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General
(archive check&correx @ eucmh)