2022 - Still Setting the Record Straight

[jrwentz]

It is the beginning of Memorial Day Weekend in the year 2022 and we still have to work to do to set the record straight. On April 12, 2022 I watched a Smithsonian Institution 2021 documentary about the Battle of the Bulge, part of the WWII Battles in Color series. I have been angry ever since. The first mention of the 106th is about seven minutes in and it claims they were "untrained men". Around eight minutes in it shows a bit of film of the 106th moving to the front. About 21 minutes in it shows Robert Citino of the National World War II Museum talking about a "green unit that "melted away" and left a hole in the defense" without saying it was the 106th, but anyone who knows even a little about the battle would know he was talking about the 106th. My continuing anger is fueled because I realized that Citino is the same guy who authored an article called "The Fall of the Golden Lions" in 2019 and placed it on the WWII museum's web site.

Here are a few of the things Citino says:

"Caught by surprise, the men of the 106th did what soldiers in such a predicament have done from time immemorial. Depending on their precise location and post at the moment, they tumbled out of bed, or they ran into each other in their haste, or they desperately tried to get the ice-cold engines in their jeeps to turn over, or they fired wildly in every direction. Their officers—from the divisional commander, Major General Alan W. Jones, on down—never did get their troops in hand or under control, and the result was a complete lack of cohesion and fighting power. Much of the division tried to run. Writing in 1949, the division's official historian, Colonel R. Ernest DuPuy, used an ugly word to describe what happened: panic.
Let's get down to hard facts. Panic, sheer unreasoning panic, flamed that road all day and into the night [of 16 December 1944]. Everyone, it seemed who had any excuse and many who had none, were going west that day."

www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fall-golden-lions

Citino references two authors, Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy who wrote "St. Vith, Lion in the Way", and Charles Whiting who wrote "Death of a Division". When DuPuy eventually explains more about his statements on panic, he is talking about the units that had been ordered back from the front and their confrontation with the 7th Armored Division, which had been ordered in to the battle. The VIII Corps had ordered their 8 Battalions of artillery back, along with an anti-tank battalion, anit-aircraft battalion, and possibly other units. The Division's artillery battalions had been ordered out too. Many of these units were already out of ammo on the first day and had been trying to get out for 24 hours or more. They were not retreating, they were moving back to get into position to fight some more. There were also cavalry troops, medical personnel, wounded soldiers, and kitchen trucks among those were were rightfully ordered out. So you have hundreds of vehicles and thousands of men trying to go west under orders meeting up with the 7th Armored Division trying to go east under orders after traveling all night to get there. The rumors about the 106th fleeing the battlefield had to come from soldiers going east who thought all those troops headed west were the combat teams. This confrontation was on December 17th, not the 16th as Citino claims.

On page 618 of "A Time for Trumpets" military historian Charles B. MacDonald calls the claims that American troops fled for safety "patently false". MacDonald spent five years researching this book, and when punches were called for, he didn't pull them. As I write this at the beginning of Memorial Day weekend I hope Mr. Citino will do some additional research and appropriately modify his article about the Golden Lions to set the record straight. The 106th did not flee, nor did they melt away. 

[jrwentz]

In 1966 a 34 page document was produced detailing the 7th Armored Division's role in the defense of St. Vith. It was written for use by the US Army Armor School. I have read some of the key sections and started to study the maps. It has some tough words for the 106th HQ operations, perhaps without fully understanding how much of the HQ staff had been sent to the battle. After all, General Jones had to put the Division Band into service protecting the HQ. One thing is clear, the 7th knows the 422nd and 423rd regiments are surrounded, and the 424th was heavily engaged. It is much easier, for me at least, to understand the routes the 7TH had to travel and the perspective of the 7th when dealing with the traffic problems, and all the action they saw. In my opinion this is a valuable document to use for setting the record straight.

www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2014/OCT_DEC/Battle%20of%20St%20Vith.pdf 

[connie]

J.R.

I deeply appreciate the correction of an old narrative of misinformation that you have begun to assemble here. It is distressing that the misinformation still persists.

Even simple, obvious facts have been ignored in an attempt to place blame where it does not belong.

One fact is that, believing or hoping that the were placing troops in a "quiet sector," the VIII Corps had them assume position along a 27 mile front. That meant that each of the division's 3 Combat Teams held a frontage that approximates what is normally held by an entire division.

A second fact: While the men of the 106th wereholding three times the normal frontage held by a division (and they went to the front as a shy division, short on manpower), at the onset of the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans sent three divisions to take out the 106th Infantry Division....

Do these facts fit in with your narrative?

Thanks for starting this discussion. It is important.

Connie

[jrwentz]

Hi Connie,

Actually, if we use the 27 mile front and the FM 7-40 Infantry Regiment Field Manual the 106th's sector should probably have had nine divisions and, in my opinion, two of them armored divisions to defend the gaps. I've read in other Army documents a rifle division should not cover more than 4.5 miles and in forested positions as little as 1 mile per regiment, with two battalions on the line one a little behind in reserve, and the artillery a good distance back. archive.org/details/Fm7-40/page/n163/mode/2up?view=theater.  See page 154, using the page numbers at the bottom of the image. Let me know if you see any errors that need correcting if you read the manual.

Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy has been criticized but I haven't seen any other real options for him to cover a winding 650 mile front from Switzerland to the North Sea. Montgomery wanted to line everybody up and invade Germany but he was pretty much alone with that view. Back in the states, as I understand it, Congress refused to fund any more Divisions, and recruits were getting hard to find. The entire VIII Corps front was thin with pretty much three Divisions defending a 60 mile "line" facing the German attack.

Patton was correct in criticizing the decision to keep the VIII Corps static in Nov of 44. If the VIII Corps had been moving things around it would have decreased the success of the opening artillery barrage. If General Jones had been permitted to move the line back behind the Our River and better defend the two bridges the German's needed it might have upset all the German plans. Of, if those "resting" armored divisions had been resting in or closer to the Losheim Gap and the Alf River Valley the Germans might have held off, not wanting to risk the heavy losses of armor and men, and the amount of time it would take them.

On page 192 of "St Vith - Lion in the Way" Colonel Dupuy wrote this:

"There were in the 106th Infantry Division's area, two essential points to be held in any defense scheme, the Schonberg pass of the Our Valley and the Heckhalenfeld hill mass west of the Schnee Eifel nose. Not only were they the bottlenecks to any westbound offensive, but they also furthered our own later offensive movements eastward. A mobile, elastic defense based on those two points, supplemented by very active patrolling and screening in the Losheim Gap and along the Schnee Eifel, was indicated. This does not appear to have been VIII Corps' solution of the problem. Instead, what amounted to a cordon defense was instituted; a cordon defense, part of which consisted of a salient into enemy-held territory. When, therefore, the 14th Cavalry Group caved in on the north, the Schnee Eifel positions were finished, as always happens in a cordon defense when any part of the line is punctured."

"These things are noted, not in excuse, but in justice to the men who fought and died."

On page 22 of Dupuy's book he identifies the 1st SS Panzer, 18th and 16th Volksgrenadiers, and 116th Panzer Divisions "assaulting the 106th's front and the roads behind them" on the first day. Over the four days of battle other German units wandered in if needed as they were trying to move to the front. I need to check for a German Order of Battle.

[jrwentz]

In the opening post for this thread I addressed some of the conditions that resulted in the traffic jam at St. Vith on the 2nd day of the battle (17 Dec 1944). I have also seen comments about the traffic flowing west on the first day (16 Dec 1944). DuPuy criticizes the westbound traffic but offers no specifics regarding any units or groups going west that were not authorized to do so. 

First, let's consider some numbers. The Table of Organization for the 106th indicates they arrived in France with 14,253 personnel and 2012 vehicles. 38.8% of the personnel are "Rear Echelon", generally considered to be non-combat personnel. This works out to about 5,530 people.Some of the rear echelon units were stationed at Vielsam. Many of these people made trips to the front every day to deliver and prepare food, do maintenance or repair work on equipment, etc. During battle, they run "ammunition trains" (trucks) to the front as well. It appears there was one sizable food truck per company or similar sized unit making the run each day. Among my brief notes made a while back I saw where one of the regiments ordered 15 food trucks back early to prevent them from being destroyed or captured, and that about half of them never made it back. Don't forget the VIII Corps had eight Artillery Battalions and some other forces in the area. The Corps Artillery alone had more than 4000 personnel, 746 vehicles, and about 98 Howitzers. 

The 5:30am artillery barrage was partly aimed at ammunition supplies. The 423rd's supply at the HQ CP in Buchet was hit, destroying half of the ammunition stored there. The artillery also hit a barn full of ammo in the Alf River Valley. Units on the front line were short on some kinds of ammo when the battle started. For example, The first platoon of Company A was covering the right flank of the 423rd Regiment along a road coming from Bleialf up to the Eifel. It was a primary route to the Eifel if any German Armor wanted to head their way. In a report on the 106th Division Website by platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Jackson D. Behling, he describes the ammo his platoon had at the start of the battle as two bandoliers of rifle rounds per man, one grenade each for half of his men (or about 20 grenades for 40 men), and one bazooka with two rounds. Lt. Behling also states the platoon didn't have a map, as was the case with most of men in the 106th. When it got light and the skies cleared a bit the platoon could see across the valley and they watched German armor and infantry streaming through the gap. He called it a "fearsome sight". Having no weapons that could reach that far Behling got a forward observer for the artillery to his location. The observer looked at the fearsome sight and apologized because his unit had already used all their Howitzer shells.

Miles away across the valley with the 424th, ammunition was also running short. Company G on the right flank had to roust up 5000 rounds of ammo for Company B of the 112th Infantry, and help them withdraw. The entire Division was calling for more ammo. The ammo dump was at Neuville, which was about a mile SE of Vielsam. Fifteen trucks were loaded with small caliber ammunition and set out for the 424th. Ten trucks went to the Service Battery of the 424th and five headed off on trails trying to get to the battalions at the front. Two of the trucks slid off the icy trail and turned over. The other three made it. So, 13 empty trucks go racing back to Neuville to load up for another run to other units. Were these trucks, and the surviving food service trucks, part of the source for reports of people "fleeing the front lines"?

The Neuville ammo dump had no carbine ammo or bazooka rounds to deliver. For another example, the 591st FAB had fired off 2,622 rounds in their Howitzers, and called for more. Seven truckloads of 105mm were loaded for delivery but the trucks got "held up" at St. Vith according to Colonel DuPuy. DuPuy doesn't give the time, or the reason they were "held up". Was it because the Artillery Commander at St. Vith was already deciding to call the FABs back to St. Vith, or possibly just trying to find a secure place for them to fall back east of the Our River? We know the VIII Corps was already moving units back. On Monday and Tuesday orders were going to 12 FABs to relocate one or more times, and eventually to move back to St. Vith or Bastogne. For example, when Colonel Puett's reserve battalion (423/2nd Bt) got to Schoenberg during the afternoon of December 16 and sent out patrols he reported the 275th FAB had withdrawn. The 275th, attached to 14th Cavalry, destroyed a lot of German armor that day. It was moved back for good reason, but was then moved back again, all the way to Sart-lez-St. Vith the next day, getting tangled in that big traffic jam with the 7th Armored. Sart-lez-St. Vith is the French name for the village of Rodt, a little west of St. Vith. The 275th Armored FAB was following orders each time they moved. They fought like hell and the commander went to General Clarke and asked to be put in the line forming to defend St. Vith. One can understand why the men of the 7th Armored Division thought they were seeing troops fleeing in a full out rout, but what a shame it is for WWII History Museum to have their facts wrong today, 78 years after the battle. As military historian Charles B. MacDonald stated decades ago, the claims are "patently false".

To further tie this story together, we know that General Jones had ordered the troops to "save all transportation possible" because at 2:15pm on 17 Dec 1944 the Commander of Troop B of the 18th Cavalry, accompanied by men from the 106th Reconnaissance unit, made radio contact with Colonel Cavender and said they were unable to reach the Regiment, which was in the process of moving the HQ to Company M's CP and preparing an all around defense. They asked Cavender for permission to withdraw via Schoenberg. Cavender responded that situation at Schoenberg is unknown and to act on their own initiative. He also told the Commander that General Jones had ordered troops to save all transportation possible. The Commander decided to try Schoenberg, probably unaware that they could go west from the Beiealf-Schoenberg Road and follow trails that would lead them to a bridge across the Our River closer to St. Vith. There were actually four bridges connected to roads that would lead back to St. Vith. One was at the village of Setz, where Colonel Riggs and the Engineers would soon be defending against the Germans coming out of Schoenberg. The other bridges would bring them out SE of St. Vith. Very few people had learned about it early, and no one really knew the situation out of their view, other than Germans were swarming in everywhere.

The Commander chose to try Schoenberg. On the way a vehicle filled with Grenadiers fell into the column of American vehicles and a gunner in an armored car quickly opened fire, killing all the Germans. The third platoon of Troop B was leading in six armored cars. Three cars crossed the bridge in Schoenberg and saw a convoy of American trucks filled with soldiers, which they quickly recognized as German Soldiers. First thinking the Germans were prisoners they were surprised to see the Germans raising their guns, so they quickly pulled over to go by them, shooting the trucks with machine guns and canister shot. They ran into a German tank that destroyed two of the cars. One got away to St. Vith. The rest of the column had held back, so quickly did what they could to destroy their vehicles and fled on foot. About 50 men made it back to St. Vith.  My question is, were these trucks filled with Germans the food service trucks that didn't make it back the day before? If not, were they part of Operation Grief, hoping to move a lot of soldiers further toward the Meuse River, or some other strategic location?

One of the points I want to make is that there were a lot of people other than these examples trying to get out because they were following orders, or simply because they couldn't make it up to the Eifel where both Regiments were "circling the wagons" for an all-around defense. Some were cutting across country south of Schoenberg and following trails. Some were cutting West north of Schoenberg, heading for the area where the Malmedy Massacre took place, gunning down captured soldiers from an artillery "flash and sound" unit, and perhaps passing by the spot where the 11 black soldiers of the 333rd FAB were tortured and killed. Units going to the north were likely cutting south on a trail that came out at Heuem, others were taking the route west toward one of the four bridges over the Our River. Any of these routes would lead to the traffic jam at St. Vith. Bad, bad things were happening east of the Our River, and we know some German troops were already east of St. Vith, close enough to be seen from the upper level of the 106th HQ. St. Vith itself was already in danger of being surrounded. The Eifel situation grew worse with each passing hour.

As the situation at St. Vith grew worse some of the non-combat units there were sent to Vielsam about the same the 7th Armored was trying to get through. This is an excerpt from the history of the 331st Medical unit at St. Vith for 17 Dec 1944 about the move to Vielsam with wounded soldiers: (note 14 hours to go 18 kms!)

Our troops were forced back by the enemy and because of the unfavorable tactical situation on the morning of the 17 December 1944 it was decided to move the Clearing Station to Vielsalm, Belgium. The 2nd Clearing Platoon departed from St. Vith at 1130 hours 17 December 1944 and by infiltration via motor convoy arrived at Vielsalm, Belgium at 1345. The distance traveled was approximately 18 kms and the reason for the delay in arrival was that the 7th Armored Division was moving up to meet the German attack and had the road blocked at many places. The new Station opened at 1430 hours in a building which was being used as a Catholic boarding school. The 1st Platoon departed from St. Vith by motor convoy at 1630 hours 17 December 1944 and arrived at Vielsalm at 0615 hours 18 December 1944. The reason for the 14 hr trip was that the St. Vith - Vielsalm highway was jammed with 7th Armored vehicles moving up to St. Vith to engage the enemy. 

The traffic jam was bad at St. Vith. It was disorderly. Tempers were flaring. Everyone had an important reason beyond their orders for getting to their assigned place. The one platoon of M.P.s was on the road(s) east of St. Vith doing its best. Everyone had a job to do and a reason to be angry. It is time for historians to get this right. No one was fleeing the battle those two days, other than a few lone deserters.

There were units of the 106th Artillery that displaced too far west. The 592nd was ordered 75km beyond St. Vith to the village of Marche by Lt. Col Favram of the Division Artillery, and that cost them three days of battle. There was an investigation and Lt. Col Favram was relieved of command. The 589th Field Artillery became victim of another doubtful order when Col. Herbert W. Kruger, commanding the 174th FA Group of VIII Corps Artillery, commandeered its services to protect the movement of his group of five battalions, then withdrawing from Bovigny through Cherain to the southwest. Enemy tanks, it was said, were in Cherain. The battalion and its three guns fiddled between Courtil and Bovigny, though the tanks never materialized. And, the Service Battery, 590th Field Artillery, now attached to the 589th, was sent over to the 592d to get all impediments away from a threatened attack, and it followed that outfit in its wandering move through Dinant. I bring these up just in case someone reads incomplete information accusing these units of running. They weren't. They were following orders.

There are more examples to illustrate my points, but I am hoping this is enough to convince people that the traffic problems around St. Vith were not caused by people fleeing the battle. If anyone has contradictory evidence or finds mistakes, please let me know. I will come back later to look for typos, words left out, or factual errors.

[jrwentz]

When did the 106th arrive in France, and how many soldiers were surrendered on December 19th?

Some sources say the 106th Infantry Division entered France on 6 Dec 1944. Most of the Division arrived before the 6th. For example, Company M of the 423rd Regiment arrived at LeHarve on 30 Nov 1944. Sgt. John Kline recorded this in his diary: (take note of the weather because this is related to the 2nd issue of how many men surrendered on 19 Dec 1944.

11/29/44
Arrived in South Hampton. Boarded the Duke of Wellington, a small English craft. It held only a small number of troops. It was showing its age and had seen a lot of action. There were ominous signs all about, like "Don't Prime Grenades" and "Keep Weapons Unloaded." The English Channel was very rough. I understand that it is always choppy. I had never been on a seagoing vessel, other than the "Queen" on our way over here. The Duke, pounding the waves with its bow, pitched and rolled like a roller coaster.
We were happy to reach the temporary harbor at Le Havre. It is standard practice on entering a harbor area to stand to, on the outside deck, with life jackets on.
11/30/44
Le Havre, France. The original docking facilities had been destroyed during the invasion. It was now made up of many old ships, cabled together to make the temporary harbor. We debarked and formed up on the docks. It was still light.
If you entered the Le Havre harbor after the invasion, like me, you probably saw the demolished house on the beach. It had a bathtub hanging out the window. I saw a picture of it after the war, in Life Magazine.
Le Havre was leveled to the ground during the invasion. There was little standing. I remember seeing a few German pillboxes that had been camouflaged to represent commercial buildings. There was a very heavy downpour of rain, as we marched nine miles to board trucks late that night.
12/01/44
Arrived at Field J-40 (a staging area) near Rouen, France. We joined other M Company members who brought along our squad jeeps. We used our pup tents for sleeping. The weather was wet and miserable. We could hardly keep the tent stakes in. As a consolation the food was good. The terrain was flat and open, with a few small woods. It reminded me of Indiana farm land. We had little to do. One afternoon, a couple of us, walked down the road and bought a bottle of wine from a farmer. He got our money, and we got his bad wine. We went across the road into some woods, where we found an old wooden building. We finished our sour wine, and then went back to camp.
We bivouacked in our two man pup tents for the six days we were at J-40. It rained, at least once a day. We were never able to get completely dry and comfortable.
12/07/44
Left J-40 combat loaded with jeep, driver and 1st gunner early morning. It was getting colder. We had the jeep top up and the side curtains on. We kept warm by using our new liquid fuel cooking stove. It was a small stove, enclosed in an aluminum canister about the size of a large thermos bottle. Some men used a can filled with sand and gasoline to keep warm. As we traveled along the French road towards Belgium, we came across miles and miles of German vehicles that had been strafed and burned. They were lying in the ditches, either completely burned or stripped.
12/09/44
As we entered St Vith, Belgium, older, established troops gave us the normal "new kid on the block" salutations. They yelled at us, "You'll be sorry" and other similar phrases, some not so nice. We set up bivouac in woods on the edge of town. The large pines, looking like huge Christmas trees made the woods quiet, warm and very beautiful. The silence and peaceful surroundings of the pines and snow, was pleasant. Especially after the week near Rouen, France, where we had rain beating on the pup tents and the hustle and noise of the motor march on the way to St. Vith.

My father, Wm J Wentz was also in Co M, 423rd. On 05 Dec 1944 he wrote a letter to his mother describing the number of men with pneumonia. We know the 422nd had never been issued galoshes, and the GI boots were not waterproof. This time in France set the stage for severe problems with Trench Foot and respiratory ailments among the men before the Battle started on 16 Dec 1944.

The 331st Medical Battalion took over responsibility for the 106th Infantry's sector at 12:01 AM on December 12. From Dec 12 through December 15 Clearing Company D at St. Vith received 480 men from the 106th for treatment. During their first three days 21 men were treated for battle casualties. The report does not mention battle casualties on Dec. 15th. 42 men were returned to duty by the 15th. This means 438 men were out of the line when the German attack began for real on December 16th. A Rifle Battalion's authorized strength is 860 men, so that means the equivalent of slightly more than half a battalion was not available. The majority of the men were from the 422nd Regiment being treated for Trench Foot, because they had not been issued galoshes.

Excerpt from the report for Company D, 331st Medical Battalion:

During our first day of operation we treated 78 cases, transferred 13 cases and returned to duty 4 cases from all units served. There were four Battle Casualties admitted during this first day. The first of whom was Pvt Koukol, John L., ASN xxxxxxx, of Co 'B', 422 Inf Regt with the following diagnosis, BC WIA Shell Wound (High Explosive) Pert W, leg, left, middle third, S, Shell Fragment. Two of the four Battle Casualties were classified as seriously wounded, and two slightly wounded. The remainder of cases admitted on this date included, Cold and moisture, reaction to, feet, bilateral, S, Nasopharyngitis, Furuncles and Gastroenteritis.

On the 13 December 1944 we treated 110 cases, transferred 15 cases; and returned to duty 6 cases. Eleven of these were Battle Casualties and the remainder included cases diagnosed as Trench Foot, Nasopharyngitis, Gastro-enteritis, etc.

On the 14 December 1944 we treated 141 cases, transferred 16 cases, and returned 10 cases to duty. Six of the 141 cases were Battle Casualties and diagnoses of the remaining included, Pneumonia, Trench Foot, Gastritis, Sprains, Bronchitis, etc.

On the 15 December 1944 we treated 151 cases, transferred 33 cases and returned 22 cases to duty. Again there were a considerable number of cases of Trench Foot (Cold and moisture, reaction to, feet) admitted. A majority of these men were not wearing Galoshes and had been on duty outside, exposed to extreme cold and damp weather for long periods of time.

A survey of the cases of Trench Foot (Cold and moist, reaction to ,ft,) revealed that the major incidence occurred in the 422nd Regt. The men of this Regt were not issued galoshes until several days after moving into positions along the front lines. They had been required to stay in outpost positions for extended periods of time and facilities for keeping clean dry socks on their feet were inadequate.

Note: If you are not familiar with Trench Foot Click Here

In the book "A Time for Trumpets" Charles B. MacDonald estimated approximately 3000 men were surrendered on December 19, 1944. He states the exact number will never be known. He based that on his "generous" estimate that the average strength of all six battalions was about 500 men. MacDonald states "Thus, the oft-quoted spectacle of some eight to nine thousand men plodding into Germany with hands overhead was false." Pages 345 and 346 of "A Time for Trumpets".

[jrwentz]

Clarifications about the weather, sunrise, and sunset.

Occasionally one may read something about the 106th on those first four days of battle that indicates it was bitter cold with deep snows. Generally, during those first fouyr days I believe it was below freezing at night and warm enough for some light rain some days. In the Battle of the Ardennes the author Hugh M. Cole reports a "thaw" on December 18 that slowed the German's advances. As for snow depth, accounts differ. This does not mean they are wrong, because the Ardennes is a big place, with variations in elevation and micro-climates. Some accounts from members of the 106th say six to 12" of snow, but Company A of the 423rd was sending out nightly patrols and reported some areas had drifts two to three feet high. On December 20 and 21 the high ground began to freeze. On the 22nd, there was rain, snow, and fog. On the 23rd a cold front from the East moved in and the skies cleared, allowing the Allied planes to fly their bombing missions. Clouds moved in on the 28th, followed the next day by Arctic air from Scandinavia with heavy snow and blizzard conditions.

From December 16 to 19 sunrise was about 8:30 AM and sunset was about 4:30 PM. On a clear day it begins to get light about half and hour before sunrise and begins to get dark about half an hour before sunset. It was cloudy and often foggy December 16-19.

[jrwentz]

I have long felt that Army intelligence did not fail in the fall and winter of 1944. Instead it was a failure of command from Middleton at the VIII Corps, to Hodges at First Army, Bradley at Group Commander, and Eisenhower at the top. Plus, I have always questioned what really happened on December 16 when Eisenhower was having a staff meeting in the late afternoon - early evening that was interrupted by an important message notifying Eisenhower, Bradley, and other generals that a major German offensive was underway in the Ardennes. Two other messages came in amplifying the seriousness of the attack. Was it possible that Eisenhower calmly accepted that it was okay for it to take that long to be notified? Bradley's reaction was to deny the seriousness of the attack and appeared reluctant to call Patton for the release of some of his armored forces. Eisenhower showed some anger when he told Bradley "Tell Patton Ike is running this damned war!" or something close to that statement. Someone in that room later said they thought Eisenhower knew about the attack before the meeting. Lately I have considered the possibility that Eisenhower withheld the information so that he could see just how Bradley would react. On December 20th, Bradley's armies were transferred to Montgomery and Patton. It is said that Bradley never forgave his friend, Eisenhower, but it appeared to me that evidence was adding up that Bradley was not the right man for the job he had. Some of the reasons are covered in the attached paper.

I recommend this paper as essential for a more complete understanding of what the intelligence community knew and reported, and how it should have warned the high command to the point of taking action. It is an easy read once you get past the first two or three pages and a little discussion about the Conceptual Framework of Social Domain Studies.

10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 

Decision making and Cognitive Analysis Track

A Historic Failure in the Social Domain
June, 2005

Excerpt:
General Bradley claimed the view of his staff was that the enemy was now fighting by the book. General Bradley wrote in A Generals Life that, “The assumption that von Rundstedt was in charge and that future operations would more or less follow the textbook was universally held in the Allied high command. I am not aware that a single soul in authority believed otherwise.” The 17 November report from Bradley’s own G-2 staff declared for the record that large German attacks could be launched not according to the book and without any detection of the preparations.

General Bradley’s claims regarding Ultra are not supportable. The intelligence staffs did not rely exclusively on Ultra, the Ultra traffic did not dry up, and he was generally forewarned that the Germans could launch an attack without detection. Furthermore Ultra and MAGIC as well as other sources did provide specific warning.

ArmyIntelReportDTIC_ADA460947.pdf (399.33 KB)

[jrwentz]

This document verifies that Eisenhower knew about the buildup of troops and discussed it with Bradley. General Strong, Chief Intelligence Officer for SHAEF "felt so adamantly about the validity of the operational intelligence indicators that he visited General Bradley the first week of December to express his concerns over an im -
pending attack." Bradley said he had a contingency plan, but this was not true. Important intelligence details were being reported down to Army level, but was not reported to the Corps Level, and therefore it was not reaching the Divisions either. Other details are discussed, but this paper does not cover everything that was known. 

You can read the entire paper at the link, or it can be downloaded in various formats PDF, Kindle, etc.


archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA192576/mode/2up
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: IS IT A PANACEA by MAJ Ronald L. Burgess,
USA, 42 pages.

by Defense Technical Information Center

Publication date 1987-04-21
Topics DTIC Archive, Burgess, Ronald L, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, *ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *INDICATORS, *INTELLIGENCE, CASE STUDIES, ELECTRONICS, FAILURE, PEARL HARBOR,

This study investigates the question that if valid operational intelligence
is available, are there reasons or factors that preclude it from contributing to
or providing operational success? Case studies utilizing intelligence indica¬
tors from Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the Battle of the Ardennes are cited for
use in the study. Doctrinal requirements from FM 34-1, Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare Operations, and FM 100-5, O perations, form the basis for
the study.

The study concludes that operational intelligence indicators were present
in all three case studies. The paper presents the case that while Midway is
considered an intelligence success and Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes an in - 
telligence failure, the intelligence indicators were present in all three to
varying degrees and therefore intelligence should have contributed to opera - 
tional success.

The senior leadership of the Allies also expressed misgivings prior to the
attack. Eisenhower had discussed his concerns with Bradley during the
month of November after he found out there were up to eight additional
German divisions opposite the Ardennes. 47 Bradley, while disturbed by the
VIII Corps front, discussed the situation with the VIII Corps commander, but
dismissed the idea of realigning the front because in his mind no viable
strategic objectives lay on the enemy's path out of the Ardennes. 48

The intelligence officers for the various commands also perceived that all
was not as it seemed. Toward the end of November the ULTRA point of
contact. Colonel Rosengarten, reminded 1st Army of the German offen - 
sive through the Ardennes in 1940 and noted that "desperate men are likely
to take desperate measures." 49

The intelligence officer for SHAEF, General Strong, felt so adamantly about
the validity of the operational intelligence indicators that he visited General
Bradley the first week of December to express his concerns over an im -
pending attack. Weigley goes on to state that Bradley told Strong he was
aware of the potential problem and had in fact prepared a contingency plan
with two divisions for just such an operation. History records that this was
not the case.

The intelligence officer for the 12th Army Group, BG Sibert, was im¬
pressed enough with the data and the other indicators that he sent his dep¬
uty, Colonel Jackson, to SHAEF and then to London to see what else Jackson
could find out.

In late 1944 ULTRA intelligence, in varying degrees of detail, was being made available  
down to Army level, but not Corps. This indicates that while Hodges may
have had some indication of possible attack, his corps commanders had to
depend on other sources as indicators could not even be referenced in the
daily intelligence traffic from higher to lower.

[jrwentz]

In the first post of this thread Citino speaks of soldiers firing wildly. The following account describes how German infiltrators in the 423rd's sector fired wildly in the darkness on the morning of December 16 trying to create fear and confusion among the soldiers of the 106th.

John Hilliard Dunn, 423/H Heavy Weapons Company, and then an MP

Information gathered and summarized from some of Dunn's accounts in the book “Voices of the Bulge: untold stories from veterans of the Battle of the Bulge", Publication Date 2011 Free to read at: archive.org/details/voicesofbulgeunt0000coll/page/26/mode/2up

EDIT: John Hilliard Dunn's full account is available on the 106th website at this link, 2nd item on the first page. This link is full of good information. The First Chapter alone is 79 single-spaced typewritten pages taken from the book "The Cub in Review" - searchable! www.indianamilitary.org/106ID/Publications/CubInReview/07-Books.htm
John Hilliard Dunn went to the Schnee Eiffel as part of heavy mortar squad with the 106th Infantry Division. John had no experience with mortars and he became an MP. As an MP he got his first look at a detailed map of the Sector and realized their positions were on a salient with Germans pretty much already on three sides of the Division. He describes ducking artillery shells for two days while on duty at Purple Heart Corner, also also known as 88 Corner. By the night of December 15th German Patrols has increased in his area. On the night of December 15/16 he was trying to sleep in a damaged and abandoned farmhouse, and he heard increased numbers of German Buzz Bombs flying overhead. Dunn also mentions increased German interference with their communications.

About midnight he was awakened to take over guard duty at Outpost #8. The soldier he releived told him “Someone is getting trigger happy around here!” A rifle round whistled over the shed at his post, coming from the direction of Outpost #7. He picked up his field phone and asked “Number 7, what the hell are you shooting at?” The reply was “I ain’t shooting at nuttin’, it must be Number 6.” It was an open circuit line and Number 6 barked “Blow it out your ass!” Then Number 9 chimed in and said “ It is probably Headquarters Company Hunting Pigs.” (There were pigs in the woods and guys on patrol would shoot them, and enjoy eating roasting pork over an open fire when they returned to their platoon. 

But the firing that had Dunn concerned was not coming from the 106th. Some Germans were nabbed and interrogated. They admitted their orders were to disrupt communications and cause confusion by firing off shots. It was hard to see in the dark so they fired at anything that looked like the wall of a shelter that might be occupied, or most anything else. 

[jrwentz]

More evidence that the German Attack on December 16, 1944 was not a total surprise

From a book written by Father Paul W. Cavanaugh, a Catholic Priest serving as a Chaplain with the 422nd on the Schnee Eifel. Father Cavanaugh died about 1979 but the book was later published and is available on the 106th web site: www.indianamilitary.org/106ID/Publications/ProDeoEtPatria/ProDeoEtPatria.pdf 

Introduction

“We better not go to sleep tonight, Paul.” I said to corporal Dalton, my assistant.

We were bumping along in our jeep over a well-packed frozen road between the second and first battalion command posts. In a quiet, wooded spot a few hundred yards back from the front lines I had just said mass. A group of about thirty men from B company with rifles slung from their shoulders had knelt in a snow to receive holy communion. Though not yet five o’clock in the afternoon, dusk was fading into darkness along the snow covered ridge under the thick growth of tall evergreen trees. It was the 15th of December, 1944, and our intelligence section was aware that a German offensive approached the hour of its mounting.

Paul Dalton and I obtained some supper at the first battalion headquarters’ mess where we learned the password and picked up some more information about the anticipated battle. We returned to the Chaplain’s headquarters, a small log cabin built over a dugout by some soldiers of the second infantry division. About twenty yards away loomed the Siegfried line bunker which housed the command post of the first battalion of the 422 regiment.

With night came fog. Several men from battalion headquarters company crowded into our cabin to make coffee and toast and to discuss the situation. Somehow we had a strange foreboding of catastrophe.

The military situation, as we knew it, was this. Our 106th infantry division (golden lion shoulder patch) had moved over to the continent from England early in the month. We had been assigned to viii corps, first army. December 9th to 11th the 106th replaced the second infantry division, unit for unit, along a twenty-seven mile front in the Schnee Eifel. The Eifel forest is on German soil just across the Belgian frontier east of the Ardennes. For about ten weeks of autumn this had been a quiet sector of the front. As our division was yet untried by enemy fire we were assigned to this locality that might be mercifully seasoned to what our regimental commander, colonel George E. Descheneaux, Jr. Had told us at Stow-on-Wold (England) was the filthy, dirty, bloody, disgusting business of modern war. For four days Paul Dalton and I had been traveling by jeep along the snow covered roads through forests of spruce trees to companies on the static front. There I had said mass in comparative security near the company command posts and unalarmed visited the foxholes and dugouts along the line of outposts.

[jrwentz]

Adding a map of the route to the Neuville ammo depot outside of Vielsam. I chose to start the route at Bleialf just as an example, but some likely used the norther route via Schoenberg to St. Vith. The name Neuville is associated with a number of locations in Belgium, France, and possibly Germany, so this map is just clarify where the regiments were going for most ammo other than the artillery rounds.