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Post by jrwentz on Sept 1, 2023 0:19:17 GMT -5
The 106th ID G-2 (Intelligence) Journal for December, 1944 includes a report from the 422nd about propaganda leaflets delivered by German artillery fire on the night of December 11.The Allies and the Germans used artillery to accurately scatter propaganda leaflets right where they wanted it. Airplane drops of propaganda was not effective because wind could carry the leaflets a long way where soldiers might never see it. Artillery units had charts for the amount of powder and the length of a fuse to use to hit a known known. Dave Daniels provided a copy of one of the leaflets dropped for the 106th. Dave's grandfather was with the 634th Anti Aircraft Artillery, which served with the 106th. Attaching images of the 422nd message, the art on the leaflet, and the written message. Dave also provided a link to a Facebook page for his friend Jesse Campana, who is a reenactor. the link takes you to photos Jesse portraying a soldier with Battery D of the 634th. Battery D was defending the 422nd motor pool and that was where The Lost 500 held out for two extra days, until 21 Dec 1944. Jesse also has a very well written post about the 634th's action with the 106th dated Dec 30, 2020. Jesse Campana Facebook Post
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Post by connie on Sept 1, 2023 10:52:03 GMT -5
Thank you J.R. & Dave, It's amazing (and chilling) to see these propaganda leaflets and to know how they were delivered! I was totally unaware that this was happening during the war... Connie PS Here's a link to a thread that holds a list of units within the division (including Dave's Grandfather's 634th AAA BN) : 106thdivision.proboards.com/post/794/thread
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Post by jrwentz on Aug 30, 2024 5:04:15 GMT -5
This is an interesting part of the summary of the 106th's G-1 (Personnel) Report of Action Against the Enemy for December 1944, by Max J. Roadruck, Lt. Colonel. There are some things here I do not recall seeing in any of the books. The full report is a little over 30 pages long, mostly the Journal records of messages and meetings.
16-31 December: On the morning of 16 December the enemy appeared to be launching a strong attack in the sector held by this division. Inaccurate artillery fire fell in the town of ST VITH during the morning. Civilian population seemed undisturbed and went about their business in the usual manner. However, by the afternoon the gendarmes and informers in the town began to grow uneasy and at the recommendation of the Military Government Officer transportation was requested for their evacuation. This transportation arrived during the night of 16-17 December and on the afternoon of 17 December these key civilian personnel were removed from the town. On 17 December it appeared that the enemy attack might make substantial gains. The remainder of the civilian population was frozen in place to prevent their interference with the movement of armored columns moving to the front to reinforce this division. Plans were also made to move part of the division CP \ to VIELSALM. Early on 18 December portions of the forward echelon of Division Headquarters arrived at VIELSALM, leaving only a command group at ST VITH which closed in VIELSALM later the same day. A large group of prisoners of war was also moved from ST VITH to the rear areas and turned over to the Army Prisoner of War Escort Guard personnel for their evacuation to rear areas. Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining Estimated Loss Reports from some of the units with any degree of accuracy due to the fact the units were apparently surrounded and out of contact by available means of communication. Communications were considerably disrupted not only with the lower units but also with higher headquarters during rearward displacement. Due to the nature of the operation, large numbers of American and enemy dead were, of a necessity, left on the battlefield.
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