Ammunition Shortages

[connie]

In a recent post, Floyd ( from the 424th) mentioned that even during first few days on line -- before the offensive began-- ammunition was low.

This most recent message can be found at: 106thdivision.proboards.com/index.cgi?action=display&board=looking&thread=677&page=1#2408

My father (who was with a Service Battery) also commented that the supply dump was cutting them down on the ammunition they could pick up each day.

Complicating the impact of this ammo rationing was the fact that they were new to the front. According to info I have gleaned, the division they replaced had, over time, been able to stockpile some reserves. But the 106th had nothing beyond their rationed daily supply.

[floydragsdale]

Hi Connie:

The 2nd Divisdion G.I's were smart. They were probably short on ammunition as well. However, having been on the front lines for a while they knew their way around, and "knew how to barter and make trades." That was against Army rules and regulation, but heck, war is war. Thus, when you learned the trade, there was more than one way to skin a cat.

Floyd

[floydragsdale]

Connie:

Here’s how things would get traded in our company.

A G.I. in the Machine Gun Section had a 45 pistol. It wasn’t worth a tinkers darn to him up on the front lines. So, he go rid of it any way he could. Example: a fellow soldier was wounded, or K.I.A; thus he took the Soldier’s weapon.

As for me, being in the Mortar Squad, my carbine was worthless as a weapon; it just wasn’t accurate. A Soldier couldn’t hit an outhouse with it if he was standing twenty feet from it. A General (Brig. Gen. Bruce Clarke) traded his Springfield 03 to me for the carbine rifle.

Vehicle drivers, truck, or jeep, were constantly on the lookout for equipment they could simply pick up, or trade for.

Our Company Supply people might be long on some things, consequently, whenever they could, they would trade it for something that the Company needed.

Necessity, was the mother, of invention. G.I.’s were constantly looking for ways to get what was essential to survive “up front.” Sometimes, a Soldier was as crafty as a squirrel in some ones back when it came to getting something that was needed to live in conditions that were so primitive.

Also, equipment was obtained by what we called a “midnight requisition”, or, just get it anyway you can.

Floyd

[connie]

Floyd,

I hadn't heard the "midnight requisition" expression but it fits a lot of things I've heard about. Great term!

[floydragsdale]

The ammunition shortage materialized, I believe, because of the ghost front for six weeks or more along an entire 80 mile front, from Luxembourg to Holland, with the country of Belgium in between them.

We (106th G.I.’s) were advised, by 2nd Division Troops, that “Nothing is going on up here. We haven’t lost a man in six weeks. Shoot at them once in a while, just to let the Germans know you are up here”

With little activity for six weeks, or more in the area, who needs a huge stockpile of ammunition? Supply depots rationed it out according to where it was being used. To add fuel to the fire, U.S. Army Intelligence did not suspect a German build up in that sector.

Finally, high ranking American Officers (Generals) were betting, between themselves, that the war would be over, by Christmas, about six weeks away.

Some "experts" said "It was a calculated risk. Other "arm chair Monday morning quarterbacks" called it a blunder.

The Soldiers who took part in the Bulge Campaign knew one thing that was certain; it was 41 days and nights of freezing hell.

What ever it was, a calculated risk or a blunder, American and German troops alike paid a hell of a price for it in wounded, K.I.A. disabled and Veterans with battle scarred memories that were to last them a life time.

Floyd

[connie]

Floyd,

As usual you sum things up well. This board is lucky to have your personal experience along with your assessment of what you have read.

The ammunition shortage... the thin defensive lines in the sector... all were part of that "calculated risk" or...?

Connie

[floydragsdale]

Hi Connie

When the Bulge Campaign was over, and even before that, there was much finger pointing as to where the problem was and who was responsible for that fiasco.

I recall newspaper reports that claimed our troops turned tale and ran from the Germans. The Troops that did run were “headquarters” troops who were not equipped to fight a war in the first place. Their job was to direct the Soldiers who were fighting the war.

We had orders to “hold your positions at all costs.” That meant stay where you are and fight until you’re dead; not throw your weapons down and run, as news correspondents reported soldiers were doing.

Before the battle started I distinctly remember hearing “activity” taking place on the German side before the battle began. It wasn’t my imagination because numerous G.I.’s in Co. G reported the same thing. All of us heard the sounds of heavy vehicle movements throughout the night. This was indicative that the Germans were up to something. This kind of activity was reported, however was it was ignored? I’m inclined to think so.

I believe the calculated risk theory by our General Staff Officers and that the majority of opinions by U.S. Army Headquarters, from Division & up were that the German Army was not capable of launching a major offensive on the Western Front anymore.

To sum things up, when an army is on maneuvers, make believe battles are fought by the book. When in War, the book is thrown out the window and the fighting is done by the “seat of the pants”; especially by the G.I. on the front lines.

When officers lay dead, and their Sergeants were licking their wounds, G.I. Joe up front never saw the situation maps at higher headquarters; they simply took matters in their hands and continued fighting the War by the seat of thier pants.

Yankee ingenuity, more that likely, was a big asset in winning the war.

Floyd