Post by connie on Sept 26, 2013 22:48:27 GMT -5
Bob posted on this under the list of units within a division:
106thdivision.proboards.com/post/801/thread
Quoting him:
"106 Divarty, HQ. Battery. Served as staff to the Artillery General and as liason between us, the Firing Batteries and Corp for fire direction info, etc. The unit was composed of: The Captain and his staff, (2 Lts., a first sargent, a clerk and a driver), the Wire Section who laid tel. wire between us and all the Firing Battalions, the Radio Section (mine) who maintained contact with the Firing Battalions and Corps., the Meteological Section (weather), a Mess Section and the Motor Pool Section. We also were present after the war, in Heilbron, assisting the POW encampments ."
Brig, Gen. Leo T. Mc Mahon, Commander
DIVISION ARTILLERY HISTORY (from Unit History on the Indiana Military Site)
The Story of the Division Artillery
May‑June 1947
(by a high ranking Artillerist who wishes to remain anonymous)
The anonymous writer of this 1947 article was in fact General Leo McMahon, Division Artillery Commander. (editor 1991)
A recent request for a history of the Division Artillery in 1000 words, to appear in the CUB, a rather difficult order to fill. Too much has to be omitted. However, shall content ourselves here very briefly with the three main contributions of the Division Artillery to the interruption of the Germans' timetable between December 16 and 23d.
The Bastion On The Left
When the German storm broke against our “front," two prongs attempted to drive in toward Schönberg, through Roth and Bleialf, while a third attacked northwest through Winterspelt toward St. Vith. The two latter were handled by the 424th and 423rd Combat Teams, but the northern one, through Roth and Losheim rounded the northern flank of the 422nd Infantry and hit the 14th Cavalry Group which guarded the twelve kilometers between our left and right of the 99th Division. The cavalry was very thin, and is not designed for such operations anyhow. They gave, though not without putting up a tough scrap first. This left the north flank of the 422nd Infantry hanging in the air in the vicinity of Roth. The Krauts, tanks and infantry, were in Auw by noon, behind our Infantry, in spite of a determined stand by our Engineers.
The entire left of the Division, as far south as Winterscheid, would have been rolled up and destroyed that first afternoon, had it not been for the 589th and 592nd Field Artillery Battalions. These boys took all that the Krauts had to offer and returned it with interest. There isn't space here to go into the exploits of the tank‑busting 4th Section of A Btry, 589th; of Lieutenant Siekierski directing fire from atop a pile of ammunition in a 592nd battery position; of the gallant work of the linesmen, keeping their lines in through an iron storm; of the thousand individual acts of heroism of officers and men. A good deal you will find in the Division history. A great deal more will never be recorded‑too much happened there, and no one had time to write it down.
Suffice it to say that the left of the Division was well protected through that red day, that the capture of Schönberg and subsequent approach to St. Vith by the Germans was put back 24 hours, that the two north combat teams were preserved for three days to come, and that Rundstedt's schedule was fatally thrown off. Not bad for two battalions on their first try.
The Wall Of Fire
Meanwhile, what of the center and right? While not as spectacularly engaged as their fellow‑artillerymen on the left, the boys of the 590th and 591st, supported by the VIII Corps Artillery battalions, were adding materially to the German difficulties. Rundstedt's schedule called for one column to seize St. Vith through Winterspelt and another via Bleialf and Schönberg, both on the first day. He should have given more thought to our Infantrymen, who didn't give easily, and to the enterprise and accuracy of our Artillerymen. Maybe he thought some other division would be there when he planned it. Anyhow, the iron curtain that the Krauts found between themselves and our doughboys further, and very materially, contributed to holding the German surge until the arrival of the divisions that came from far away to back us up the 9th and 7th Armored, the 82nd, the 30th, the 3rd Armored, the 84th, and 75th.
Of the twelve organic battery positions that we had been ordered by VIII Corps to occupy “man for man and gun for gun,” only that of C Btry 591st FA Bn was properly selected for defense, and this alone enabled the 424th Combat Team to withdraw intact in the early morning of the 18th, and to escape the fate of the 423rd. This was a combat team operation for the books. All routes to the rear were cut off, but Captain Black's boys put down their fire in the right places and lots of it, the 424th Infantrymen rushed the German lines back clear of the crossroads, and all the vehicles of the Combat Team, including our 591st Battalion, made good their displacement through Berg Reuland, and in turn supported the withdrawal of C Btry and the foot troops.
And as long as their ammunition held out, the lads of the 590th were piling German dead in Brandscheid, Muhlenberg, and Bleialf; in Prüm, Sellerich, and Hontheim; and in the stream beds, at the road junctions, and through the dismal corridors of the Schnee Eifel.
They Shall Not Pass
After A Btry with other elements of the 589th fought its way through the closing door at Schönberg, leaving behind their stout‑hearted executive 1st Lt. Eric Wood Sr. and steadfast 1st Section, they were not destined to enjoy the rest that their heroic efforts had earned them. After various close shaves, they found themselves, on the afternoon of the 19th, at Baraque de Fraiture Crossroads, where they were ordered to rest and reform. Small chance. Already Houffalize, twelve kilometers to the south had fallen, and before nightfall the boys at “Parker's Crossroads” had already run hostile tanks out of Samree', six kilometers to the west.
The position was a highly important one, at the intersection of two main roads, and guarding the right flank of the 82nd Airborne Division. Major Parker decided to hold it, and hold it they did for three crucial days while power was building up to hold the German push. They had help at times, a platoon of quadruple‑mount 50‑caliber AA machine guns helped break up one attack; a Captain Woodruff with a platoon of 82nd Division Infantrymen gave some help; a lost assault gun came by and gave its best in the cause as long as its ammunition held out; and some armored elements took part in repelling one attack. But these people, while welcome, came and went. The rock that protected the right of the stanch 82nd Division, and therefore the whole north shoulder of the Bulge, was the remnant of the 589th Field Artillery Battalion that rallied around its three remaining guns and beat back everything that the Krauts had to offer.
And they had plenty, in ever‑increasing waves. The first attack, after a day of feeling out and interdicting, was approximately a company of infantry in the early morning of the 21st. From then until the position was overwhelmed by a coordinated attack of everything that the book recommends for such occasions in the late afternoon of the 23rd, they never faltered in their trust. They could have abandoned the position early in the game and been well within their orders. They could have abandoned their guns and made it safely away until the last few hours. But they didn't. They stayed and wrote a chapter of American fighting history that fits right in with the best we have —the Alamo, the Round Tops, the Lost Battalion. They were one of the outstanding of the devoted bands of unsupported American soldiers against which the best plans of Rundstedt and Sep Dietrich were useless and against whom their best troops beat in vain. Nobody told them to stay. But nobody told them not to, except the Germans. And so they stayed.
106thdivision.proboards.com/post/801/thread
Quoting him:
"106 Divarty, HQ. Battery. Served as staff to the Artillery General and as liason between us, the Firing Batteries and Corp for fire direction info, etc. The unit was composed of: The Captain and his staff, (2 Lts., a first sargent, a clerk and a driver), the Wire Section who laid tel. wire between us and all the Firing Battalions, the Radio Section (mine) who maintained contact with the Firing Battalions and Corps., the Meteological Section (weather), a Mess Section and the Motor Pool Section. We also were present after the war, in Heilbron, assisting the POW encampments ."
Brig, Gen. Leo T. Mc Mahon, Commander
DIVISION ARTILLERY HISTORY (from Unit History on the Indiana Military Site)
The Story of the Division Artillery
May‑June 1947
(by a high ranking Artillerist who wishes to remain anonymous)
The anonymous writer of this 1947 article was in fact General Leo McMahon, Division Artillery Commander. (editor 1991)
A recent request for a history of the Division Artillery in 1000 words, to appear in the CUB, a rather difficult order to fill. Too much has to be omitted. However, shall content ourselves here very briefly with the three main contributions of the Division Artillery to the interruption of the Germans' timetable between December 16 and 23d.
The Bastion On The Left
When the German storm broke against our “front," two prongs attempted to drive in toward Schönberg, through Roth and Bleialf, while a third attacked northwest through Winterspelt toward St. Vith. The two latter were handled by the 424th and 423rd Combat Teams, but the northern one, through Roth and Losheim rounded the northern flank of the 422nd Infantry and hit the 14th Cavalry Group which guarded the twelve kilometers between our left and right of the 99th Division. The cavalry was very thin, and is not designed for such operations anyhow. They gave, though not without putting up a tough scrap first. This left the north flank of the 422nd Infantry hanging in the air in the vicinity of Roth. The Krauts, tanks and infantry, were in Auw by noon, behind our Infantry, in spite of a determined stand by our Engineers.
The entire left of the Division, as far south as Winterscheid, would have been rolled up and destroyed that first afternoon, had it not been for the 589th and 592nd Field Artillery Battalions. These boys took all that the Krauts had to offer and returned it with interest. There isn't space here to go into the exploits of the tank‑busting 4th Section of A Btry, 589th; of Lieutenant Siekierski directing fire from atop a pile of ammunition in a 592nd battery position; of the gallant work of the linesmen, keeping their lines in through an iron storm; of the thousand individual acts of heroism of officers and men. A good deal you will find in the Division history. A great deal more will never be recorded‑too much happened there, and no one had time to write it down.
Suffice it to say that the left of the Division was well protected through that red day, that the capture of Schönberg and subsequent approach to St. Vith by the Germans was put back 24 hours, that the two north combat teams were preserved for three days to come, and that Rundstedt's schedule was fatally thrown off. Not bad for two battalions on their first try.
The Wall Of Fire
Meanwhile, what of the center and right? While not as spectacularly engaged as their fellow‑artillerymen on the left, the boys of the 590th and 591st, supported by the VIII Corps Artillery battalions, were adding materially to the German difficulties. Rundstedt's schedule called for one column to seize St. Vith through Winterspelt and another via Bleialf and Schönberg, both on the first day. He should have given more thought to our Infantrymen, who didn't give easily, and to the enterprise and accuracy of our Artillerymen. Maybe he thought some other division would be there when he planned it. Anyhow, the iron curtain that the Krauts found between themselves and our doughboys further, and very materially, contributed to holding the German surge until the arrival of the divisions that came from far away to back us up the 9th and 7th Armored, the 82nd, the 30th, the 3rd Armored, the 84th, and 75th.
Of the twelve organic battery positions that we had been ordered by VIII Corps to occupy “man for man and gun for gun,” only that of C Btry 591st FA Bn was properly selected for defense, and this alone enabled the 424th Combat Team to withdraw intact in the early morning of the 18th, and to escape the fate of the 423rd. This was a combat team operation for the books. All routes to the rear were cut off, but Captain Black's boys put down their fire in the right places and lots of it, the 424th Infantrymen rushed the German lines back clear of the crossroads, and all the vehicles of the Combat Team, including our 591st Battalion, made good their displacement through Berg Reuland, and in turn supported the withdrawal of C Btry and the foot troops.
And as long as their ammunition held out, the lads of the 590th were piling German dead in Brandscheid, Muhlenberg, and Bleialf; in Prüm, Sellerich, and Hontheim; and in the stream beds, at the road junctions, and through the dismal corridors of the Schnee Eifel.
They Shall Not Pass
After A Btry with other elements of the 589th fought its way through the closing door at Schönberg, leaving behind their stout‑hearted executive 1st Lt. Eric Wood Sr. and steadfast 1st Section, they were not destined to enjoy the rest that their heroic efforts had earned them. After various close shaves, they found themselves, on the afternoon of the 19th, at Baraque de Fraiture Crossroads, where they were ordered to rest and reform. Small chance. Already Houffalize, twelve kilometers to the south had fallen, and before nightfall the boys at “Parker's Crossroads” had already run hostile tanks out of Samree', six kilometers to the west.
The position was a highly important one, at the intersection of two main roads, and guarding the right flank of the 82nd Airborne Division. Major Parker decided to hold it, and hold it they did for three crucial days while power was building up to hold the German push. They had help at times, a platoon of quadruple‑mount 50‑caliber AA machine guns helped break up one attack; a Captain Woodruff with a platoon of 82nd Division Infantrymen gave some help; a lost assault gun came by and gave its best in the cause as long as its ammunition held out; and some armored elements took part in repelling one attack. But these people, while welcome, came and went. The rock that protected the right of the stanch 82nd Division, and therefore the whole north shoulder of the Bulge, was the remnant of the 589th Field Artillery Battalion that rallied around its three remaining guns and beat back everything that the Krauts had to offer.
And they had plenty, in ever‑increasing waves. The first attack, after a day of feeling out and interdicting, was approximately a company of infantry in the early morning of the 21st. From then until the position was overwhelmed by a coordinated attack of everything that the book recommends for such occasions in the late afternoon of the 23rd, they never faltered in their trust. They could have abandoned the position early in the game and been well within their orders. They could have abandoned their guns and made it safely away until the last few hours. But they didn't. They stayed and wrote a chapter of American fighting history that fits right in with the best we have —the Alamo, the Round Tops, the Lost Battalion. They were one of the outstanding of the devoted bands of unsupported American soldiers against which the best plans of Rundstedt and Sep Dietrich were useless and against whom their best troops beat in vain. Nobody told them to stay. But nobody told them not to, except the Germans. And so they stayed.