What 106th Soldiers didn't know during the Bulge Campaign

[floydragsdale]

Countless tales have been written about the Bulge campaign, however from the memories of one 106th Division member who was there, a few simple words can describe that gigantic scuffle and that is our division was like a nail getting hit with a sledge hammer over and over again. The Golden Lion Division was introduced to the art of warfare faster than any other division in the United States Army.

Floyd,
424th Regiment

[upssfcc]

Floyd,

Thank you for keeping this part of history alive for many of us who can't even begin to imagine what you and so many others had gone through for us.

Ruth

[floydragsdale]

Thank you Ruth, for your input.

For at least fifty plus years I had a guilt feeling that we (106th Division) let the Army down. Prior to the Bulge affair the U.S. Army stormed the beaches of Normandy, raced across France and Senior Officers were betting that the war would be over by Christmas.

I recall the words of a 2nd Division Officer, when we were relieving them from their combat posts on Schneeifel.

He said, “You people are getting a piece of cake up here. Nothing's going on up here. We haven’t lost but one man in six weeks and it was his own fault because he just had to go souvenir hunting one night and that cost him his life. All is quiet on this front".

Little did we realize that an army ten times our size was crouched like a wild animal, several thousand yards from our Division, preparing to pounce on its’ victim.

They attacked, - - - wave after wave of them and at times, the front was whatever direction a Soldier faced.

The President of the United States met with the Secretary of war and the one in charge of the Manhattan Project (Atomic Bomb Development) to discuss the use of the yet untried Atomic Bomb on German soil if our troops could not reverse the tide of that battle.



When it was all over many 106th Division men, including this one, had no idea of the odds that were against us that and we participated in the largest campaign ever fought and won by the American Army.

The Bulge Campaign haunted my memories for many years until I remembered the oath that all of us pledged when entering the Army.

I obeyed that pledge, did what we were ordered to do, including many things we couldn’t do in civilian life.

Remembering that oath and what we (106th Division) did to honor it, I felt like a free man again.

Overcoming nightmarish memories about the Battle of the Bulge was almost as bad as some of the actions we had to endure.

Floyd
424th Regiment

[upssfcc]

Floyd,
Wow your words sure hit home. I guess maybe that is why my dad never really talked about the war, I am sure it was a rude awaking for anyone at any age. It seems like back in the forties more people really did stand for something and honor their commitments. Thank you again for your memories it give some of us a glimpse into what true patriotism and honor is.
Ruth

[floydragsdale]

Thank you again, Ruth,

I give my 2nd Grade Teacher credit for some of the things she taught us. She reminded us frequently, “Have respect for your parents, respect for your country and above all, respect for God.”

Not only did we learn and sing patriotic songs; we studied the verses and the meaning of them. That’s how all of us learned our national anthem, The Star Spangled Banner and the conditions under which they were written.

God bless our teachers! As they taught us our daily lessons, we (students) were reminded that all of us were our nations future and as we entered the everyday adult world the baton of responsibility would be passed to us. One teacher said, “You people have a rendezvous with destiny.

Little did we realize that our homeland would be involved in two wars on opposite sides of this world. Our generation took the baton of responsibility and handed this nation the torch of victory and, last but not least saved this country’s freedom for future generations.

Floyd
424th Regiment

[upssfcc]

Floyd,

I too was taught to respect others,and of course God. We were proud of our country and what our country stood for. I just wish that kids today could feel that pride. I pray that what you and every veteran has sacrificed for this great country will not be in vain.

Ruth

[eucmh]

Since the end of World War Two, no Historian has ever put on paper the reason for which the 422 & 423-IRs (+) were lost to the enemy. I will try to explain this into experimental English. Having walked often the area between Manderfeld (Schoenberg - Amerlscheid and the hill down to Bliealf & Pronseld) + the road in and from Steinbruck with William Cavanagh (he was working for me during this period) and Charles B. McDonald (who was my spiritual father in history) I could put out my point of view about this and they agreed.
We know that two divisions were send to the front line during the month of December, the 99-ID and 106-ID. The 99th Infantry was assigned an area and could place their defenses the way they used to do this while the 106th wasn't assigned a sector, but foxholes at a rate of 1 man 1 foxhole.

Where is the problem that did push the 422 & 423 to be annihilated by Manteuffel's 5. Panzer-Army ? The answer is quiet easy !

Situation on December 15 1944 ! The 1A was installed mainly along the German Border while some US troops (99-ID, 4-ID, 9-ID) where even occupying part of Germany. (Not including the troops around Aachen and the other troops in Holland). These units were resting not for Christmas like lot of 'historians' said but before a massive restart of the offensive inside Germany. The deal up front was the Roer River and especially the Roer River Dams - Olef Talsperre - Urf Talsperre - Roer Talsperre (Schwammenauel) which could - if released - flood the entire Roer River Valley.

What does this make on the front line ? The positions of the first line were between defensive positions and offensive positions. For the veteran units which were battling since Omaha Beach it wasn't to much of a problem because the men knowing each other knew how to get along with the troops on the field ready to act into what we should cool team work.

For the 106th Infantry Division it was entirely different. The fact of being a 'green' unit doesn't mean that they wouldn't be capable of figthing the German. The 99th Infantry Division was as green as the 106th Infantry Division and it became one of the best (if not the best) Battle of the Bulge unit in the norther shoulder. The 106th toke over the 'offensive' positions of the 2nd Infantry Division. The positions were digg by the 2nd Infantry Division to be used by men of the 2nd Infantry Division. The replacement of the 2-ID by the 106-ID was worked out as told - NO CHOICE - one foxhole one man. This broke instantly up the 'military habits' the 'team works' and 'the ways to act' as learned in the US for every men of the 106-ID.

This was the first problem with the 106-ID and the way the stragglers of the 422 and 423 (+) as well as the 424-IR show that they guys were also great combat soldiers.

The second problem was the situation of the FCP LOD MLR MSR and RCP of the 422 & 423 were located. If you take the time to check the map of the Bulge you'll see that only 2 axes of penetration was available to Dietrich's 6.-SS-Panzer-Army and Manteuffel 5.-Panzer-Army. The 6.-SS had to get inside Belgium in 3 different ways : the railroad track Losheim - Bullingen (via Buchholz Station; Hergesberg to Lanzerath (via Hassenven); Kher to Schoenberg and St Vith (via Manderfeld) and Bliealf-Pronself to Schoenberg and St Vith (via Amerlscheid). This place the 422 and almost half of the 423 (+) inside a triangle with in their front the 5.Panzer and a main penetration axe between the 422-423 +/-) and the 6.SS on their rears, the main axe of penetration being every single roads getting south from the initial axe of penetration (Lanzerath - Honsfeld - Holzheim - Manderfedl - down to the Manderfeld-St Vith Road) the new axe of penetration as the north shoulder of the 6.SS-Panzer-Army being challenged and stopped in the front of the Ridge in Elsenborn and all the units (1.SS for exemple) being pushed down south to get through).

The boundary between the 106-ID was in the north the Cavalry (it was a 'rear' boundary) and in the south CCB and element of the 9-AD. When the thing blew up on December 16, the 422 and 423 were almost immediately - after the Cavalry failed and was set into pieces - surrounded and as soon as the German were in Schoenberg, the last to get out of the trap was Eric Fisher Wood who reached Hermitage between St Vith and Meyerode cut again by element of the 6.SS.

There was no way for anyone to reach up to the 422 and 423. C-47 and parachuting supply wasn't possible because not only the weather was making this possible but no one in the US Army had a single idea who the hell these 2 regiments were at. Sure they knew about the initial position but ... parachuting (if) supply doesn't work with maybe 1 mile left or 1 mile south !

These men of the 106 ID did a hell of a great job and while giving a lot of problem to the German spearhead they allowed the 7-AD to get inside St Vith to removed and withdraw all the US units there then the 7-AD to withdraw trough the 82nd Airborne Division !

[connie]

Thank you, Gunter, for this detailed analysis.

I know that the "man for man"/ foxhole for foxhole replacement orders did not place the men of the 106th Infantry division in defensible positions that General Jones felt comfortable with either. Your analysis fits well with everything I have read.

Your take on the parachute drops is interesting, too. General Jones ordered 2 supply drops, which of course did not happen. I believe he assumed that the first supply drop had happened before he ordered the second. The fog was, of course, a major factor. I hadn't thought about the fact that the shifting positions of the isolated units (422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments plus most of the 590th Field Artillery Battalion) combined with the severed lines of communications would have caused a problem had an air drop been possible.

Your words of commendation to the troops are meaningful. Early on it was easy for those who had not studied the situation to look to blame the "green" troops for the demise of their units. It sounds like you came to a different conclusion quite early on in your careful search for facts.

Connie